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INTRODUCTION
The criminal law’s formal criteria for assessing punishment are
typically contained in criminal codes, the rules of which fix an
offender’s liability and the grade of the offense. Those rules classically
look to an offender’s blameworthiness, taking account of both the
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seriousness of the harm or the evil of the offense and an offender’s
culpability and mental capacity. Courts generally examine these
desert-based factors as they exist at the time of the offense. To some
extent, modern crime-control theory sometimes prompts code drafters
to look at circumstances beyond the offense itself, such as prior
criminal record, on the grounds that these factors relate to the crimecontrol goals of deterrence and incapacitation.1
A look at how the punishment decisionmaking process actually
works in practice, however, suggests that courts and other
decisionmakers frequently go beyond the factors that the criminal law
formally recognizes. These extralegal punishment factors (“XPFs”) are
the subject of this Article.2 XPFs include matters as diverse as an
offender’s apology, remorse, history of good or bad deeds, public
acknowledgment of guilt, special talents, old age, extralegal suffering
from the offense, forgiveness or outrage by the victim, and special
hardship of the punishment for the offender or his family. These XPFs
can make a difference at any point in the criminal justice process at
which decisionmakers exercise discretion, such as when prosecutors
decide which charge to press, when judges decide which sentence to
impose, when parole boards decide when to release a prisoner, and
when executive officials decide whether to grant clemency. They also
make a difference in less visible exercises of discretion, such as in
decisions by police officers and trial jurors.
What effect, if any, are these XPFs having in the exercise of
discretion by criminal justice decisionmakers? What effect should they
have? If such XPFs should be taken into account, how should this be
done? These are the questions addressed here.
Part I of the Article sketches out a variety of XPFs and
illustrates decisionmakers’ reliance on them. For each XPF examined
here, some claim has been made, through explicit argument or open

1.
See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO
SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? (2008) (addressing the various considerations commonly
utilized in apportioning punishment).
2.
Not included within this study are factors that the formal liability and punishment
rules do not take into account and that no one would seriously claim should be taken into
account, such as race or beauty. There is some evidence that people might well take such factors
into account, in some cases perhaps subconsciously. See, e.g., David A. Abwender & Keyatta
Hough, Interactive Effects of Characteristics of Defendant and Mock Juror on U.S. Participants'
Judgment and Sentencing Recommendations, 141 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 603, 606–10 (2001)
(demonstrating through empirical study that the physical attractiveness of an offender may be
influential in punishment determinations by juries); Paul Skolnick & Jerry I. Shaw, The O.J.
Simpson Criminal Trial Verdict: Racism or Status Shield?, 53 J. SOC. ISSUES 503, 503 (1997)
(finding that considerations of race may play a role in punishment determinations). Presumably
no one would argue that a criminal justice system should take such factors into account.
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practice, that reliance on the factor in determining punishment is
appropriate. The support for some XPFs has blossomed into official
approval in appellate court opinions or in sentencing guidelines,
usually signaling to decisionmakers that the factor may be relied on,
but rarely requiring such reliance.
There are good reasons to want to know how people feel about
XPFs as a basis for adjusting punishment. First, these judgments can
tell us something about how people are exercising their discretion in
the current system, a fact that is difficult to document because such
discretionary judgments are commonly out of public view. Further, as
Robinson has argued elsewhere, there can be practical benefits to a
criminal justice system that builds moral credibility with the
community it governs, which can be done by imposing criminal
liability and punishment only when and to the extent that the
community will view as just. A system perceived as unjust provokes
resistance and subversion; inspires vigilantism; and loses the power to
stigmatize conduct, to gain compliance in borderline cases, and to
shape powerful societal and internalized norms.3
The Part I discussion of each XPF uses previous studies, which
are rare, and reports their findings regarding people’s intuitions of
justice on the subject. Part II reports the results of our empirical study
of lay intuitions regarding these factors, examining which factors
seem to have intuitive support among laypersons and to what extent.
Part III takes up the implications of these findings for criminal justice
reform.
I. EXTRALEGAL PUNISHMENT FACTORS
XPFs, as defined here, include any factor that may influence
the determination of what punishment an offender should receive
other than (1) factors relating to the harm or evil of the offense, (2)
factors relating to the blameworthiness of the offender in committing
the offense, and (3) factors relating to the classic coercive crimecontrol principles of deterrence or incapacitation. Many, if not most,
3.
For a fuller account, see ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 175–210; Paul H. Robinson & John
M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2007) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Intuitions] (suggesting that judgments about
justice are based more on intuition than on reasoning); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U.L. REV. 453, 453 (1997) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Utility]
(arguing for a form of desert-based liability based on the community’s shared principles of
justice); Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1995–2025 (2010) (analyzing how a system’s moral credibility and crimecontrol effectiveness are undermined by a distribution of liability that deviates from community
perceptions of just desert).
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factors considered at sentencing, even discretionary factors, are not
XPFs. The mental capacity of the offender may influence a judge’s
determination of the appropriate sentence, yet it is a factor that
relates to the offender’s blameworthiness and hence is not an XPF as
defined here. The notion of “mercy” may be an XPF as defined here,
but it in fact is sometimes used to refer to the consideration of factors
like an offender’s youth, prior record, or rotten social background,4
which relate directly to notions of blameworthiness and deserved
punishment. A more narrow meaning of mercy, which refers to
forgoing punishment that is in fact deserved, might well include
reference to XPFs, such as forgiveness by the victim or hardship to the
offender’s family.5
Legislatures or sentencing commissions have recognized some
XPFs as permissible grounds for aggravation or mitigation, but they
rarely require that a sentencing judge take account of these XPFs in
this manner.6 Rather, XPFs come into play when judges exercise their
sentencing discretion, “taking into consideration various factors
relating both to offense and offender.”7 In the federal context, for
example, Congress clamped down on judicial discretion by creating the
U.S. Sentencing Commission and empowering it to enact mandatory
Sentencing Guidelines.8 But that discretion reemerged in the wake of

4.
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law
Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation? 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 10 (1985)
(suggesting that socioeconomic deprivation may mitigate criminal responsibility and warrant
recognition as a criminal defense).
5.
For several of the factors considered in this study, one could construct an argument that
the factor related to the offender’s blameworthiness for the offenses. For example, remorse after
the offense might be viewed this way, even though it occurs only after the offense is complete. We
include these factors in the study nonetheless because it is certainly not the accepted view that
such factors, which did not exist at the time of the offense, affect an offender’s blameworthiness
for it.
6.
In the Model Penal Code formulation, for instance, the presence of some XPF in a death
penalty case may give rise to a mandatory mitigation. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (2001)
(withdrawn 2009).
7.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000).
8.
Congress created the U.S. Sentencing Commission order “to reduce ‘unjustifiably wide’
sentencing disparity.” Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988). In accordance with this
goal, the Commission produced the Sentencing Guidelines, which substantially constrained
judges’ ability to sentence offenders ad hoc. “While a judge, pre-Guidelines, had the discretion to
consider uncharged conduct or acquitted conduct, post Guidelines, it was mandatory, and that
conduct came to have specific determinate consequences—an increase in one’s sentencing score
and a concomitant increase in one’s sentence.” Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American
Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 702
(2010).
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the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,9 which
“stripped the Guidelines of the force of law” and “enhanced the
position of the judge” to make discretionary sentencing decisions.10
Thus, the decision of whether to mitigate or aggravate punishment in
light of some XPF begins and often ends with the sentencing judge. As
a result, consistency in the application of XPFs to specific cases is
lacking, even though an XPF can have a real effect on the amount of
punishment an offender receives.11
Rather than examine every plausible XPF, we look only at
those for which there is some defensible argument that has been
made, or could be made, for seriously taking the factor into account.
For example, while some decisionmakers might in fact be influenced
by an offender’s race or physical attractiveness,12 no one seriously
argues that such influences should be allowed. Our interest is in
providing guidance to reformers, so we consider only those XPFs that
have at least some colorable claim to legitimacy. The eighteen factors
discussed below fit these criteria. None of the factors directly relate to
offense harm, offender blameworthiness, or coercive crime-control
principles, and each factor has at least either some apparent use in
current practice or support by punishment theorists.
The eighteen XPFs are divided into four general categories:
XPFs that relate to (1) the offender’s reaction to his own offense, (2)
the victim’s or public’s reaction to the offense, (3) the offender’s status

9.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J., remedial opinion)
(finding “the provision of the federal sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory . .
. incompatible with today’s constitutional holding” (internal citations omitted)). Booker followed
on the heels of Blakely v. Washington, in which the Supreme Court held that Washington's
sentencing regime, insofar as it allowed a judge to base an upward departure on facts not found
by a jury, ran afoul of the Sixth Amendment. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04
(2004).
10. Gertner, supra note 8, at 706. For instance, federal judges need not rely on
“extraordinary circumstances” when imposing a sentence outside the Guidelines’ range. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007). Moreover, sentencing decisions by district court judges
today are reviewed by appellate courts under an “abuse-of-discretion standard,” “[r]egardless of
whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range.” Id. at 51. It should be
noted, however, that the Guidelines continue to play an important role in federal sentencing.
“Even after the Supreme Court declared mandatory application of the Guidelines to be
unconstitutional, many judges . . . continued to use the numbers in the Guideline framework as a
point of reference.” Gertner, supra note 8, at 706.
11. In federal court, inconsistency in guideline departures was apparent even before Booker.
See Michael S. Gelacek et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An Empirical
and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 363–65 (1996) (noting that departure
decisions may be evaluated in light of applicable case law, Commission policy, and information
presented in the Probation Officer’s report).
12. See Abwender & Hough, supra note 2; Skolnick & Shaw, supra note 2.
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or character, and (4) the collateral hardship that normal punishment
may cause the offender or third parties.
A. Offender Reaction to the Offense
An offender’s conduct after an offense typically has no effect on
his blameworthiness for the offense. All of the information necessary
to assess blameworthiness generally exists as soon as the offense has
been committed. Nonetheless, what an offender does after committing
an offense may have an effect on the proper level of punishment, at
least insofar as lay people intuit. This Section examines the XPFs that
most commonly take into account postoffense conduct.
1. Acknowledgment of Guilt
Perhaps the most widely recognized XPF is a defendant’s
acknowledgment of guilt. In federal court, the discount is formalized:
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual calls for a two-step decrease
in offense level if “the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense.”13 The Guidelines’ commentary lists
seven factors for judges to take into account in determining whether a
defendant qualifies, including the defendant’s truthful admission of
“the conduct comprising the offense[]” and “the timeliness of the
defendant’s conduct in manifesting the acceptance of responsibility.”14
The Commission has also noted that additional mitigation “may be
warranted” when “the defendant voluntarily discloses to authorities
the existence of, and accepts responsibility for, the offense prior to the
discovery of such offense, and if such offense was unlikely to have
been discovered otherwise.”15 But a defendant who acknowledges his
guilt only after he is convicted cannot expect much leniency. The
Guidelines make clear that “this adjustment is not intended to apply
to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof”; only
in “rare situations” may an offender demonstrate acceptance of
responsibility and go through the ritual of a trial.16
13. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2010).
14. Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1.
15. Id. § 5K2.16; see also United States v. Stewart, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1342 (E.D. Tenn.
2001) (“Even though the Commission has not explicitly enumerated extraordinary acceptance of
responsibility as a favored basis for departure, it has indicated a departure may be appropriate
where a defendant's assistance in the investigation and prosecution of his or her offense rises to
a level beyond what one ordinarily sees in a standard case.”).
16. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2 (2010). Such
departures are only available in “extraordinary” cases to offenders convicted of obstruction or
similar crimes tending to impede administration of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Honken,
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Acknowledgment of guilt is also a powerful mitigator in many
state courts. A few states parallel the federal guidelines with statutes
providing that judges should consider a defendant’s acknowledgment
of guilt at sentencing.17 It is more common, however, for states to
require more from defendants than merely an acknowledgment of
their wrongdoing. New Jersey, for example, allows judges to consider
“the willingness of the offender to cooperate with law enforcement
authorities” as a mitigating factor.18 In fact, New Jersey judges are
prohibited from considering a guilty plea without more,19 though in
this regard New Jersey is an outlier. Other states allow mitigation
when offenders provide assistance to authorities, but these states do
not explicitly bar judges from considering an acknowledgment of guilt
in and of itself.20 Some theorists have advocated for a reduction in
punishment where an offender has admitted guilt, irrespective of his
motivation.21
184 F.3d 961, 971 (8th Cir. 1999) (reversing a district court’s sentence reduction for an offender
who had both obstructed justice and later accepted responsibility, holding that “the mere fact of
the guilty plea to the underlying offense, followed by an absence of post plea obstructive conduct
is not by itself sufficient to establish an extraordinary case . . .”).
17. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-2(a) (1974) (allowing a judge to consider a “plea[] of guilty”
as a mitigating factor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e)(11) (1993) (listing as a mitigating factor
when “[p]rior to arrest or at an early stage of the criminal process, the defendant voluntarily
acknowledged wrongdoing in connection with the offense to a law enforcement officer”); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4699 (2005) (designating situations where “[t]he convict accepted his
accountability at some phase of the criminal prosecution” as mitigated); CAL. CT. R. 4.423(b)(3)
(2007) (recognizing mitigating factors in cases where “[t]he defendant voluntarily acknowledged
wrongdoing before arrest or at an early stage of the criminal process”).
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(b)(12) (1978).
19. Id. § 2C:44-1(c)(1) (“A plea of guilty by a defendant or failure to so plead shall not be
considered in withholding or imposing a sentence of imprisonment.”).
20. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-804(c)(1)(I) (1993) (allowing such a mitigation upon motion
of the state); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.4-102(4)(h) (2003) (taking cooperation into account as a
mitigating factor in capital cases); FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(2)(i) (1997) (“The defendant cooperated
with the state to resolve the current offense or any other offense.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-3204(14) (1973) (“The defendant cooperated with law enforcement authorities by bringing other
offenders to justice, or otherwise cooperated.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(10) (1989) (“The
defendant assisted the authorities in locating or recovering any property or person involved in
the crime.”). Some jurisdictions with sentencing guidelines have phrased the factor in similar
terms. See D.C. VOLUNTARY SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5.2.3(7) (2010) (“The defendant
has provided substantial assistance to law enforcement in the detection or prosecution of other
offenders, and departure for this reason does not demean the seriousness of the defendant’s
crime or create an unacceptable risk to the safety of the community.”); MO. RECOMMENDED
SENTENCING USER GUIDE 15, 17, 23 (2011) (“The defendant has cooperated with law
enforcement.”); OR. ADMIN. R. 213 008 0002(1)(a)(F) (2009) (“The offender cooperated with the
state with respect to the current crime of conviction or any other criminal conduct by the
offender or other person.”).
21. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969,
1974–78 (1992) (supporting right of defendants to negotiate sentences as a way to rationally
avoid trial); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
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2. True Remorse
“True remorse” involves a sincere expression of contrition for
the commission of the offense. Such remorse might be expressed
independently of, or in conjunction with, an acknowledgment of guilt.
Several writers have advocated for the use of true remorse as a
mitigator of punishment. Jeffrie Murphy writes that “[t]he repentant
person has a better character than the unrepentant person, and thus
the repentant person—on this theory—simply deserves less
punishment than the unrepentant person.”22 In the same vein, Austin
Sarat has argued that “remorse blunts the edge of retribution; it
engenders forgiveness . . . . [a]nd, if not forgiveness, remorse at least
seems to call for mitigation of punishment.”23
Several jurisdictions treat true remorse as a discretionary
consideration. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines suggest that “a
downward departure . . . might be considered where a defendant,
motivated by remorse, discloses an offense that otherwise would have
remained undiscovered.”24 Many states similarly permit the use of
remorse as a mitigating factor.25 The Florida Supreme Court, for
example, has held that “any convincing evidence of remorse may
properly be considered in mitigation of the sentence.”26 As recently as
2002, the Indiana Supreme Court overturned a sentence due, in part,
to a failure to consider testimony pertaining to the offender’s
expressions of remorse for her crime.27 Some state statutes also allow

1909, 1914 (1992) (arguing that under classical contract theory a defendant who gives up
statutory entitlements should be expected to get a sentencing reduction in return).
22. Jeffrie Murphy, Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 143, 157 (Amitai Etzioni & David Carney eds., 1997).
23. Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment: An Analysis of
Popular Culture, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 168, 169 (Susan Bandes ed., 1999).
24. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.16 (2004) (emphasis added).
25. E.g., State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869, 887 (Ariz. 1997); Jackson v. State, 684 So. 2d 1213,
1238 (Miss. 1996); State v. Allen, 994 P.2d 728, 764 (N.M. 2000).
26. Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 1983). Florida also recognizes remorse as a
mitigating factor by statute. FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(2)(j) (1997) (recognizing as a mitigating factor
when “[t]he offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident
for which the defendant has shown remorse.”).
27. Crawford v. State, 770 N.E.2d 775, 783 (Ind. 2002). Other courts have held similarly.
See, e.g., State v. McKinney, 946 P.2d 456, 458 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (mitigating a sex abuse
conviction when the family desired reunification); Commonwealth v. Mills, 764 N.E.2d 854, 866
n.9 (Mass. 2002) (noting that a defendant’s willingness to admit guilt is a proper factor for
consideration in more lenient sentencing); State v. Graham, 308 S.E.2d 311, 315 (N.C. 1983)
(giving great weight to confessions as a mitigation factor as “admission[s] of culpability,
responsibility and remorse”); State v. Buttrey, 756 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988)
(considering defendant’s remorse as a mitigating factor but offsetting it with defendant’s
previous criminal history).
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evidence of a lack of remorse to be used as an aggravator for criminal
sentencing.28 State courts in some instances have sanctioned
aggravation for lack of remorse through case law.29 Analyses show
that sentencing judges commonly give lighter punishment to
remorseful offenders.30
3. Apology
A simple expression of apology from the offender to the victim
of a crime is often thought to be worthy of consideration as a
mitigating factor.31 The sentencing courts of most states draw a
significant distinction, however, between apology and remorse,
generally refusing to recognize the former as a legitimate reason to
mitigate, at least not without some other indication that it signals the
latter. “Courts often view [simple statements of apology] as per se
inadequate and take offense to the notion that saying ‘sorry’ is
enough.”32 Often, courts will closely parse the language of an
offender’s statement of apology in order to determine whether true
remorse is present. Examples of such refusals to mitigate based on a
close examination of an offender’s apology abound: An Indiana court
concluded that an offender’s statement that he was “very sorry about
what happened” was “ ‘equivocal at best’ and ‘well short of a full
acceptance of responsibility.’ ”33 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
similarly upheld a trial court’s denial of apology-based mitigation on
the grounds that “[t]he trial justice apparently detected no salt in
[offender’s] tears; nor do we.”34 The Pennsylvania Superior Court
affirmed a trial court’s unmitigated sentence due to a lack of credible
remorse, holding favorably that “in reply [to offender’s apologies and
28. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(D)(5) (1994) (noting lack of remorse as indicating
that the offender is likely to commit future crimes).
29. See, e.g., McAbee v. State, 770 N.E.2d 802, 806 (Ind. 2002) (allowing lack of remorse as
a statutory “aggravating factor” adding ten years to defendant’s sentence); People v. Griswold,
747 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (App. Div. 2002) (upholding sentence given defendant’s lack of remorse);
State v. Mollicone, 746 A.2d 135, 138 (R.I. 2000) (same); State v. Clegg, 635 N.W.2d 578, 580
(S.D. 2001) (inferring lack of remorse from defendant’s “continued refusal to take
accountability”).
30. See, e.g., STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITECOLLAR CRIMINALS 115–18 (1992) (noting that remorse and contrition count in all kinds of cases,
not just white-collar cases, and that they count more for defendants without a prior record).
31. Bibas has advanced utilitarian arguments for such consideration, though again they do
not claim that such apologies affect offenders’ blameworthiness. See infra note 38 and
accompanying text.
32. Bryan H. Ward, Sentencing Without Remorse, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 131, 143 (2006).
33. Id. at 144 (quoting Price v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1245, 1253 (Ind. 2002)).
34. Id. at 144–45 (quoting State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1045 (R.I. 2002)).
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excuses] the sentencing court noted ‘[w]e heard your talk . . . but talk
is cheap. You are judged on your actions.’ ”35
One area in which a bare apology (without any indication of
remorse) seems to be acceptable for consideration in state courts is in
capital sentencing, during which sentencing juries may “not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death.”36 The sentencing jury is, of course, not required to give weight
to all mitigating factors advanced by the offender, but states cannot
prohibit consideration of an apology in capital sentencing.37
B. Victim or Public Reaction to the Offense (Unrelated to Desert)
Parties other than the offenders in criminal cases may exert
influence on the amount of punishment imposed. XPFs involving such
parties include opinions and representations to the court made by
victims or third parties, many of whom have no relation to the events
that led to the prosecution, but who are nonetheless interested in the
punishment imposed on the offender.
1. Forgiveness by Victim
In the unusual case in which a victim forgives an offender prior
to sentencing, an argument might be made that the victim’s feelings—
even absent requests for leniency—should play a role in determining
the appropriate punishment. Stephanos Bibas has argued that “the
state should take the victim’s interests into account by giving weight
to the victim’s forgiveness.”38 According to Bibas, doing so will promote
emotional healing on the part of the victim, will humble the offender,
will place the victim above the offender in the societal power
continuum, and will satisfy the victim’s psychological needs.39
Courts routinely hear victim opinions through victim-impact
statements. Indeed, forty-eight states protect the rights of victims to
participate in allocution in sentencing, and in the remaining two

35.
36.
37.
38.
(2007).
39.

Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 604–05.
Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329, 338
Id.
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states judges have discretion to allow victim participation.40 Some
victims will choose to use their statement as an opportunity to express
forgiveness for the offender.
2. The Victim’s Demand for Punishment
As opposed to the simple fact of victims’ emotional expressions,
this punishment factor concerns actual demands by a victim or some
other party for either greater or lesser punishment. Such punishment
demands may arise apart from any forgiveness on the part of the
victim. The life sentence imposed on Aaron McKinney, one of two
teenagers convicted for the brutal murder of Matthew Shepard, is
illustrative.41 Although Shepard’s parents never forgave McKinney for
his crime, they insisted that prosecutors refrain from seeking the
death penalty.42 Instead, McKinney was given a plea agreement of life
in prison without parole.43
Some scholars have argued in favor of permitting victims to
express their views of the appropriate level of punishment.44 While it
is common practice to allow victims to offer general impact
statements, only a few states give crime victims a right to offer
sentence recommendations.45 In some states, victim-impact
statements are expressly forbidden from including sentencing
requests. In Texas, for example, victims are generally precluded from
offering such opinions.46 The Texas Court of Appeals has held that

40. Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611, 615
(2009).
41. Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance, and the Role of
Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1600 (2000).
42. Id. At McKinney’s sentencing hearing, Shepard’s father said, “You robbed me of
something very precious and I will never forgive you for that. Mr. McKinney, I give you life in the
memory of one who no longer lives. May you have a long life and may you thank Matthew every
day for it.” Id. In addition to honoring their son’s memory, the plea agreement meant “no drawn
out appeals process, no chance of walking free on a technicality or receiving a lighter sentence
and no opportunity for McKinney to become a symbol.” Id.
43. Id.
44. Cassell has argued that such victim-impact statements “promote justice without
interfering with any legitimate interests of criminal defendants . . . . [They] help convey valuable
information to sentencing judges and have other beneficial effects.” Cassell, supra note 40, at
611. In sum, Cassell writes, “crime victims should have the opportunity to provide a victimimpact statement at sentencing,” and that statement should be taken into account before a
sentence is imposed. Id. at 647.
45. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.13 (C)(4) (1994) (providing that victims can
include in their statements a “recommendation for an appropriate sanction or disposition for the
defendant”); Randell v. State, 846 P.2d 278, 280 (Nev. 1993) (construing NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
176.015 to allow victims to give testimony as to the proper sentence for an offender).
46. E.g., Gross v. State, 730 S.W.2d 104, 105–06 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
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“[o]n the question of punishment [the opinions of nonexpert witnesses]
have little value, because the witnesses are in no better position to
form an opinion than the jury itself, and the allowance of such
opinions in evidence would constitute merely an appeal to sympathy
or prejudice.”47
When victims express an opinion, they commonly request
harsh punishment for the offender.48 For example, in one Nevada case,
a victim stated, “I wish that [the offenders] would spend the rest of
their lives in jail and that they would die there. And have every
torment possible that a jail can give them.”49 Paul Cassell has argued
that “even if victim-impact statements lead to harsher penalties in
general or to a longer sentence in a particular case, that would hardly
provide a convincing reason for banning them.”50 Cassell bases this
argument on the premise that “some emotion is inherently desirable
in a criminal process.” He suggests that victim-impact statements
illustrate the emotional impact of the crime, which might not be
properly understood if the victim were presented as a “shadowy
abstraction.”51
Less commonly, victims may request a lower sentence than is
normally imposed. There are few examples in state courts of such
victim requests for leniency. In 2009, the Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed the imposition of a sentence lower than the maximum
permissible, observing that “[t]he trial court considered the victims’
request for leniency and imposed a shorter sentence than it would
have without the request.”52 Similarly, another Michigan court
affirmed a downward departure based on a victim’s letter asking for
leniency, explaining that “the request of the victim [and one other
factor] ‘keenly’ and ‘irresistibly’ grab our attention and are of
‘considerable worth’ in deciding the length of the sentence.”53
The Florida District Court of Appeal came to the opposite
conclusion when faced with a similar question: while “[t]he trial court
also found that a downward departure sentence was justified based on
the victim’s request for a non-incarcerative sentence,” the appeals
court concluded that because “[g]enerally, mitigating circumstances
47. Id. at 106.
48. See Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness Sentence Recommendations in Capital
Trials, 41 B.C. L. REV. 517, 529 n.73 (2000) (collecting sources).
49. Randell, 846 P.2d at 279.
50. Cassell, supra note 40, at 636.
51. Id.
52. People v. Smith, No. 284828, 2009 WL 2136903, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. July 16, 2009).
53. People v. Washington, No. 235241, 2004 WL 243369, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 10,
2004).
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supporting a downward departure ameliorate the level of the
defendant’s culpability,” the victim’s request was not an acceptable
ground for a downward departure.54 Nonetheless, this holding does not
seem to be a categorical rule in Florida—while some cases have
overturned downward departures based on victim requests,55 other
Florida courts have approved of such departures.56 Courts have
expressed a variety of views on the matter.57
3. The Public’s Demand for Punishment
Public opinion is generally not considered an acceptable factor
for a judge to consider in criminal sentencing. It may commonly play
an important role but not one that is openly acknowledged.
Presumably, a state’s legislature already considered community views
on appropriate levels of punishment when it graded offenses and set
sentencing ranges or guidelines. Appellate courts generally regard any
sentence modifications made by judges for this XPF to be in error. The
Vermont Supreme Court, for example, overturned an aggravated
sentence imposed after a trial judge allowed into evidence twenty-two
petitions calling for a sentence increase. The court held that
[t]he trial judge appears to have been influenced by these petitions and the close public
scrutiny at the sentence review hearing. By admitting the petitions into evidence he
unwittingly injected bias, prejudice and public clamor into the case. [We thus] must
remand the case . . . and require that the hearing be held before a different judge.58

The New Jersey Supreme Court has come to the same
conclusion under different facts, holding that “[p]remising a
sentencing decision on public outcry against a particular defendant is
no mere technical error. It is nothing less than the surrender of our

54. State v. Knox, 990 So. 2d 665, 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
55. See, e.g., State v. Ussery, 543 So. 2d 457, 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (overturning a
downward departure that had been granted by victim request).
56. See, e.g., State v. Bernard, 744 So. 2d 1134, 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); State v.
Powell, 696 So. 2d 789, 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
57. Tennessee’s Supreme Court has also addressed the issue of victim requests for leniency,
striking down a trial court’s grant of probation for an offender who caused his nephew’s
drowning death while fleeing from the police in a vehicle and crashing into a river. State v.
Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 337 (Tenn. 2008). Though the trial court placed significant weight on the
victim’s request, the court decided that the offender’s conduct was “sufficiently reprehensible and
offensive . . . as to require incarceration to avoid depreciating the offense.” Id. at 348. Thus,
“while we appreciate the . . . pleas for leniency, we are troubled by the message such leniency
would send.” Id. However, it seems that this was a highly fact-specific decision—while Tennessee
may appear to frown upon deference to such requests for leniency, the state does appear to have
adopted Texas’s categorical rule against victim-impact testimony.
58. State v. Rice, 483 A.2d 248, 257 (Vt. 1984).
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criminal justice system to public pressure.”59 Finally, the U.S.
Supreme Court has also disapproved of the use of public opinion in
sentencing, holding that
[t]here can be no doubt that [the constitutional safeguards attaching to criminal
procedure] embrace the fundamental conception of a fair trial, and that they exclude
influence or domination by either a hostile or friendly mob. There is no room at any
stage of judicial proceedings for such intervention; mob law is the very antithesis of due
process.60

Despite this bar on the consideration of public opinion,
sentencing judges are still confronted with this kind of evidence.
During the sentencing phase of the trial of Lewis “Scooter” Libby, the
presiding judge received over two hundred letters expressing an
opinion as to the appropriate punishment for Libby.61 While the judge
in that case explicitly denied considering these letters,62 the possibility
remains that other judges in similar situations might succumb to
public pressure and consider public sentiment, regardless of whether
such consideration is acknowledged.
C. Offender Status or Characteristics (Unrelated to Commission of the
Offense)
Many of an offender’s characteristics, though unrelated to his
or her blameworthiness for the offense, nonetheless may influence the
amount of punishment imposed. In assigning punishment, a
decisionmaker may take into account, for example, the offender’s
status within the community, the offender’s past actions or character,
or the offender’s present characteristics unrelated to the offense. Some
have argued that many characteristics of this type ought to be
considered in setting punishment for criminal offenses, despite the
fact that they do not relate to the law’s traditional desert or crimecontrol criteria for liability and punishment.
1. Offender’s Good Deeds or Character
The previous good works of an offender can render him more
sympathetic in the eyes of the community and, in some cases, in the
eyes of the court. Peter Henning has argued that, at least in the

59. State v. Humphreys, 444 A.2d 569, 576 (N.J. 1982).
60. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965).
61. See Scott Sundby, The Libby Letters: Reflections on Sentencing and Mercy in a Post
Booker World 11 (Washington & Lee Pub. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Accepted Paper
2009-2, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1354254.
62. Id.
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context of white-collar crimes, “consideration of prior good works [is]
an appropriate issue in deciding sentences for defendants.”63 Other
authors agree; Douglas Berman has written that
every sentencing system (guideline or otherwise) provides for sentence enhancements
(often huge enhancements) based on such a record of prior bad deeds. Doesn’t it make
some logical sense for a sentencing system to similarly provide for sentence reductions
based on a notable record of prior good deeds such as military service?64

During the sentencing phase of most trials, prior convictions
typically act as an aggravating factor.65 However, “[f]ew jurisdictions
explicitly recognize prior good acts as a mitigating sentencing factor.
Trial judges have occasionally reduced an offender’s sentence on the
basis of prior good actions that are unrelated to the conviction, such as
military service or charitable work.”66 Decisions recognizing good
character as a mitigating factor have been overturned by higher courts
or frowned upon by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.67 Unlike the
federal courts, North Carolina explicitly addresses prior deeds and
character in its sentencing provisions: the state’s felony sentencing
statute allows for mitigation in the case of a previous honorable
discharge from the military68 or if the person “has been a person of
good character or has had a good reputation in the community.”69
Tennessee courts have recognized military service as a mitigating
factor at sentencing,70 and several other states refer to “character” as
a possible consideration in sentencing.71
63. Peter J. Henning, Prior Good Works in the Age of Reasonableness, 20 FED. SENT’G REP.
187, 187 (2008).
64. Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Law and Policy: Should Prior Military Service Reduce a
Sentence?, SENT’G L. & POL’Y BLOG (Apr. 14, 2006, 9:12 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law_and_policy/2006/04/should_prior_mi.html.
65. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2010) (instructing sentencing
judges to take an offender’s criminal history into account when setting his sentence); cf.
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998) (“[P]rior commission of a serious
crime . . . is as typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine.”).
66. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1109, 1111 (2008).
67. Id.
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A 1340.16(e)(14) (2011).
69. Id. § 15A 1340.16(e)(12).
70. See, e.g., State v. Overton, No. 02C019510 CC00303, 1997 WL 287665, at *3 (Tenn.
Crim. App. June 2, 1997) (“With respect to the appellant’s military service, honorable military
service may always be considered as a mitigating factor consistent with the purposes of the 1989
Sentencing Act.”).
71. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 777 So. 2d 856, 892–93 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (upholding
death sentence but noting that it was a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that two witnesses
from the offender’s church testified that he was a person of good character and participated in
church activities); State v. Williams, 904 P.2d 437, 452–53 (Ariz. 1995) (holding that trial court
correctly found a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that the offender displayed good
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Although there is disagreement over the general issue, the
picture is clearer in the context of capital sentencing. The Supreme
Court held in Lockett v. Ohio that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest
kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.72

Thus, the admissibility of evidence of good deeds or character is
constitutionally guaranteed and may be introduced as a possible
mitigating factor in the sentencing phase of all death penalty cases.73
On the federal level, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines do allow
for mitigation in rare instances outside of capital cases. As the
Guidelines themselves state, “Military, civic, charitable, or public
service; employment related contributions; and similar prior good
works are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure
is warranted.”74 The use of such evidence, under extraordinary
circumstances, has been upheld in several circuits.75
2. Offender’s Bad Deeds or Character
The consideration of an offender’s bad character—distinct from
his criminal history, which is often formally included in punishment
criteria because of its usefulness in identifying dangerous
offenders76—is often advanced as a factor appropriate for
character prior to murdering the victim because he was law abiding and had previously saved
lives of others); In re Marquez, 822 P.2d 435, 448–49 (Cal. 1992) (holding that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence that included fact that his family members
would have testified that he was a good son and brother, he worked hard, and he had good
character traits); Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d 1078, 1108 (Del. 1990) (noting that it was mitigating
that the offender offered to donate his kidney to his cousin), vacated, 503 U.S. 159 (1992); People
v. Thompkins, 732 N.E.2d 553, 569–70 (Ill. 2000) (holding that defense counsel was ineffective
for failing to present mitigation that included that the offender was a good family person, was
kind, and may have saved the life of a youth officer who later became a police chief); State v.
Marshall, 586 A.2d 85, 162 (N.J. 1991) (noting that the offender’s character was shown by his
civil, business, and philanthropic acts but affirming death penalty), supplemented by 613 A.2d
1059).
72. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 587 (1978).
73. See Hessick, supra note 66, at 1119 (discussing the Supreme Court’s requirement that
all mitigating evidence be allowed in death penalty cases).
74. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (2010) (emphasis added).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 663 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding defendant’s
downward departure was warranted in light of extraordinary circumstances); see also Jeffery L.
Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the Progression Toward a
Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 662 n.194 (2004) (collecting sources).
76. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2010) (“A
defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus
deserving of greater punishment.”); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM:
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consideration in punishment.77 For example, in his dissenting opinion
in Dawson v. Delaware, Justice Thomas argued that evidence of a
criminal offender’s racism was relevant at sentencing.78 There,
Thomas argued that the offender’s racist character was itself evidence
of other culpable conduct, and it was therefore appropriate to consider
the evidence as a rebuttal to mitigating character evidence and as an
indication of future dangerousness.79 Similarly, Garvey has argued
that evidence of character, good or bad, can be appropriately
considered for punishment purposes, albeit in the limited context of
determining whether to grant or withhold mercy in capital
sentencing.80
State courts commonly consider an offender’s character and
prior acts in sentencing, even when an offender’s prior actions or
characteristics are unrelated to the crime at issue. For example, the
Indiana Supreme Court upheld a sentence based on a trial court’s
finding that the offender “was ‘incorrigible’ and had been away from
home without permission” and “had given birth to two children by the
age of eighteen.”81 On review, the court found these factors (among
others) to be reasonable sentence aggravators. Arizona courts have
similarly held that sentencing judges “should consider not only the
circumstances of the offense charged but also the moral character and
past conduct of the defendant himself” in assigning punishment.82

THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 15 (2004),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Publications/Recidivism/200405_
Recidivism_Crimina_History.pdf (“The empirical evidence shows that criminal history as a risk
measurement tool has statistically significant power in distinguishing between recidivists and
non-recidivists.”).
77. Rachael A. Hill, Comment, Character, Choice, and “Aberrant Behavior”: Aligning
Criminal Sentencing with Concepts of Moral Blame, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 975, 989 (1998)
(“According to character theory, criminal actions serve as a lens through which to view an actor's
character traits. If a particular action expresses bad character, the actor is morally
blameworthy.”).
78. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 171 (1992) (Thomas, J. dissenting).
79. Id. at 173–74.
80. See Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain From Heaven”: Mercy in Capital Sentencing,
81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1029 (1996) (arguing that all character evidence—good or bad—is
irrelevant to concerns of just punishment but may be considered for a different moral question of
whether to extend mercy). “Mercy,” as used by Garvey, distinguishes an offender’s actual desert
from the emotional response his situation evokes among a capital-sentencing jury. Garvey
proposes that, because such emotional responses cannot be eliminated, it is appropriate to allow
the consideration of extralegal factors as part of a separate “mercy phase” of sentencing. See id.
at 1012–17.
81. Davidson v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1077, 1091 (Ind. 1990).
82. State v. Castano, 360 P.2d 479, 480 (Ariz. 1961).
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3. Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation has had a tortuous history in American
punishment law and practice. Previously forming the foundation of
penal policy at both the federal and state level,83 rehabilitation has
been roundly criticized as a vague, hard-to-apply concept in practice.84
Nevertheless, rehabilitation continues to play a role in some
sentencing courts, particularly in states that still have indeterminate
sentencing.85
Rehabilitation of an offender as a factor in determining
punishment amount is most commonly considered at parole hearings,
where the parole board might consider rehabilitation in its decision
whether to grant early release. While in some cases rehabilitation may
take place before sentencing, judges are more likely to consider an
offender’s potential for rehabilitation and impose less punishment in
cases where rehabilitation seems likely. Some scholars, such as Mae
Quinn, argue that “good defense lawyers have long collected
mitigating evidence from the inception of the case and presented proof
of rehabilitation, when appropriate, in plea negotiations and in
seeking leniency at sentencing.”86 Particularly in the context of
juvenile justice, defendants often argue that the potential for
rehabilitation is a worthy consideration in sentencing.87
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide that one of the factors
that may be considered by the administrating court is “post-offense
rehabilitative efforts (e.g., counseling or drug treatment).”88 In
applying this mitigation, the Eastern District of New York held that
“rehabilitation ‘cannot be served if a defendant can look forward to
nothing beyond imprisonment’ . . . . It is doubtful whether [the

83. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 7 (1973) (noting
that in 1973, rehabilitation was a popular theory of punishment).
84. See generally id. (arguing that rehabilitation theory does not produce uniform
judgments).
85. See Jeremy Travis & Sarah Lawrence, The Urban Inst., Beyond the Prison Gates: The
State of Parole in America 4–7 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310583_
Beyond_prison_gates.pdf (noting the continued prevalence of parole boards and indeterminate
sentencing in America).
86. Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to Professor Wexler’s Warm Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Invitation to the Criminal Defense Bar: Unable to Join You, Already (Somewhat Similarly)
Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REV. 539, 574 n.181 (2007).
87. See, e.g., Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing our Children to Die in
Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 1008 (2008) (“The harsh sentences
dispensed in adult courts do not take into account . . . their potential for rehabilitation and
reintegration into society.”).
88. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1 (2010).
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normally imposed sentence] provides such hope.”89 The Second Circuit
has concluded that, while it is inappropriate to provide harsher
sentences to promote rehabilitation, this factor can be appropriate to
consider for downward sentencing departures—giving reduced
sentences to offenders who appear especially likely to be
rehabilitated.90
The Supreme Court recently endorsed rehabilitation as a
punishment factor. In Pepper v. United States,91 the petitioner, who
had been convicted of a drug offense, litigated his sentence for over
five years.92 During that time, the petitioner not only completed a
prison-based drug rehabilitation program, but he also enrolled in a
local community college, attained a supervisory role at a part-time job,
and started a family. According to the Court, this evidence of
rehabilitation “support[ed] a downward variance from the advisory
[Sentencing] Guidelines range.”93 The change in conduct since his
initial sentence “provided the most up-to-date picture of Pepper’s
‘history and characteristics.’ ”94
In the states, courts have often held that potential for
rehabilitation can be a mitigating factor.95 Interestingly, some states
require consideration of the potential for rehabilitation in certain
situations. In South Dakota, for example, “a life sentence should only
be imposed where the facts and previous convictions make
rehabilitation so unlikely that the interests of society are best served
by lifetime incarceration.”96 Illinois has a broader requirement that
rehabilitation be considered in sentencing: “There are dual

89. Simon v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
90. United States v. Maier, 975 F.2d 944, 948 (2d Cir. 1992); see also In re Sealed Case, 573
F.3d 844, 849 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[S]entencing courts may not treat rehabilitation as a reason for a
longer term of imprisonment.”); United States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2007)
(same); United States v. Harris, 990 F.2d 594, 596 (11th Cir. 1993) (same). Some circuits have
allowed District Court judges to impose longer sentences in order to enable an offender’s
participation in a correctional treatment program. See, e.g., United States v. Hawk Wing, 433
F.3d 622, 630 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding an upward departure for “rehabilitative goals”).
91. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1229 (2011).
92. Id. at 1242.
93. Id. at 1236–37.
94. Id. at 1249.
95. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986); State v. Schad, 788 P.2d 1162, 1172
(Ariz. 1989); State v. Smith, 863 P.2d 1000, 1009 (Mont. 1993); State v. Davis, 477 A.2d 308, 311
12 (N.J. 1984); State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 786 (Tenn. 2001); see also Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393, 398 (1987) (criticizing the proceedings at the state level for permitting jury
instructions to not consider evidence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances).
96. State v. Bult, 529 N.W.2d 197, 200 (S.D. 1995).
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considerations in sentencing. The seriousness of the offense and
rehabilitation of the offender both are to be given weight.”97
In most state and federal courts the consideration of an
offender’s rehabilitative potential is purely discretionary. Even where
a court must consider rehabilitation, as in South Dakota or Illinois,
considerable discretion still remains as to the amount of mitigation, if
any, with which to credit the offender.
4. Unique Talents or Special Value of Contributions to Society
The special talents of an offender may be relevant to
punishment decisions where the decisionmaker recognizes that
punishment may deprive society of those talents. William Berry has
argued,
A potential example of when such mitigation would be appropriate is one in which an
essential contributor to an underprivileged community commits a minor offense, and the
harm to the state of giving him a custodial sentence, because of the consequences of his
corresponding absence, outweighs the small diminishment in achieving retributive or
utilitarian punishment goals that results from mitigation.98

For example, a small-town doctor accused of theft might be given a
reduced or nonincarcerative sentence so as to keep his medical
services available to the town’s citizens. Similarly, a great artist or
novelist might be given a reduced sentence so that society will not be
deprived of his artistic contributions.
In the context of punishment in military courts, some scholars
have argued that an offender’s special “talents” or “training” should be
taken into account in sentencing.99 The value of the offender to his
organization may be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration; a
long sentence deprives the service of the offender’s talents, and that
deprivation must be balanced against the harm that the offender has
caused.100
An illustration of the consideration of unique talents can be
seen in the dramatic story of Frank Abagnale, Jr.101 During a criminal
career spanning several continents and ultimately costing the victims
of his various scams over $2.5 million, Abagnale gained extensive
97. People v. Young, 529 N.E.2d 497, 501 (Ill. 1988).
98. William W. Berry III, Extraordinary and Compelling: A Re-Examination of the
Justifications for Compassionate Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850, 883 (2009).
99. Russell W.G. Grove, Sentencing Reform: Toward a More Uniform, Less Uninformed
System of Court Martial Sentencing, 1988 ARMY LAW. 26, 32 (suggesting that special training
and talents, among other factors, be included in presentence reports).
100. Id.
101. See generally FRANK W. ABAGNALE, JR. & STAN REDDING, CATCH ME IF YOU CAN: THE
TRUE STORY OF A REAL FAKE (2000).
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knowledge and skill in the methods employed by counterfeiters and
other fraudsters.102 Upon his ultimate capture, he was sentenced to
serve twelve years in federal prison.103 Despite his sentence, Abagnale
was released after serving fewer than five years on the condition that
he use his knowledge and experience to assist the FBI—essentially
using what he had learned as a criminal to capture other criminals.104
The use of his talents in apprehending criminals and preventing
further crime had no bearing on his blameworthiness for his past
offenses, but it may be argued that society as a whole benefitted more
from the use of his talents than from his incarceration.105
D. Suffering Apart from Official Punishment
Finally, the appropriate punishment to be imposed on an
offender may be affected by special hardship that the punishment
would impose on the offender himself or on third parties that depend
on or care for him. Old age is a specific example of this kind of special
vulnerability to punishment’s effect, but it also invokes sympathy for
other reasons. Situations where an offender has already paid
substantial civil compensation to the offender are also part of this
aspect of the calculus of proper punishment.
1. Special Offender Hardship Resulting from the Offense
Many offenders suffer as a result of their actions irrespective of
any criminal punishment levied. Should this self-caused suffering be
taken into account in assessing punishment amount? Consider, for
example, a drunk driver who accidentally kills his daughter in an auto
accident. That the intoxicated driver is guilty of a crime is clear.
However, unlike many others convicted of the same offense, such an
offender must also endure the loss of a loved one. Should the
emotional pain justify a reduction in punishment?
In many jurisdictions, an offender who has suffered as a result
of the offense can introduce this suffering to argue for a reduced
102. Id. at 4–5.
103. Id. at 281.
104. Id. at 284. Abagnale has since made a career of teaching others, both in and out of law
enforcement, about issues of fraud prevention. ABAGNALE & ASSOCIATES (Feb. 20, 2012),
http://www.abagnale.com.
105. It is notable that in the decades since his release, Abagnale has made full restitution to
nearly all of his victims. Peter Ross, Man on the Run; The Racy Life of the World's Most
Notorious Con Man Has Been Immortalised by Leonardo DiCaprio in Catch Me If You Can. But
the Real Frank Abagnale is a Reformed Character Who's Now Chasing the Bad Guys for a Living,
SUNDAY HERALD (Glasgow), Jan. 26, 2003, at 3.
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sentence. However, without an additional showing of exceptional
circumstances, such suffering is generally not enough to justify a
discounted sentence. In Michigan, for example, the state supreme
court overturned a trial court’s downward departure from state
sentencing guidelines where the offender “had already paid a
significant price for his crimes, namely the loss of his family and
employment,” on the grounds that “neither loss grabs our attention as
being exceptional.”106 It seems likely that an “exceptional” amount of
suffering could trigger a valid downward departure, but it is unclear
what might constitute that level of suffering.
Similarly, in 2009 the Washington Supreme Court approved
the use of such an XPF when it overturned an accomplice-to-DUI
conviction.107 There, the defendant was the only survivor of a group of
seven intoxicated persons involved in a single-car crash.108 Though the
trial court found the defendant guilty, the supreme court reversed and
wrote the following:
While we would not hesitate to condemn Hedlund’s conduct as reprehensible and indeed
criminal, neither do we find it absurd to say that she has been punished enough. Her
lack of judgment permitted the loss of the lives of her fiancé as well as several friends,
and she spent months rehabilitating from her own severe injuries; further legal
penalties would be dwarfed by the suffering she has already endured.109

The federal courts have also approved some downward
departures based on offenders’ prior suffering. In sentencing an
offender convicted of filing a false tax return, a trial court disregarded
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ ten- to sixteen-month recommended
sentence and instead imposed only a term of probation and a fine,
noting in part that the offender had already suffered substantially and
“had been treated for depression due to the stress of the instant
investigation.”110 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that
the “District Court’s conclusion rests on precisely the kind of
defendant specific determinations that are within the special
competence of sentencing courts.”111

106. People v. Dean, No. 266438, 2006 WL 3077520, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2006).
107. City of Auburn v. Hedlund, 201 P.3d 315, 319–20 (Wash. 2009).
108. Id. at 319.
109. Id.
110. United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Hearing
Transcript at 56 U.S. v. Gardellini, No. 06cr00355–01 (D.D.C. 2007)).
111. Id. at 1095.
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2. Special Hardship from Punishment
Suffering resulting from an offender’s official punishment is
rarely a ground for mitigation—for good reason: punishment, at least
in its retributivist justification, serves the purpose of causing an
offender to suffer. However, in some cases, unusual hardship can
result from the imposition of a traditional sentence. Hardship beyond
that typically inherent in and intended by a sentence may be used as a
mitigating factor, especially when the hardship is born by a dependent
of the offender or another innocent third party.112 For example, a
single parent who commits a crime for which he would normally be
sentenced to a long prison term might receive a mitigated sentence
because his child would be left with no guardian if the full sentence
were imposed.
Other scholars argue that in some situations, the likelihood
that punishment will cause atypical and severe harm to the offender
could be justification for mitigation.113 William Berry has argued that
“the early release of an inmate because of a terminal illness will not
unduly compromise the utilitarian goals of incapacitation, deterrence,
and rehabilitation. The terminal illness will substantially reduce the
risk of dangerousness, [will reduce] the need for rehabilitation, and
will not impede any deterrent effect of the sentence.”114 In short, the
value inherent in compassion can outweigh the interests sacrificed by
exercising it. Others agree with Berry’s argument, but advocate
different means to account for excessive hardships. For example, Kobil
and others advocate the use of the clemency power in situations of old
age or illness. If, for example, a ten-year sentence is given to an
offender with a life expectancy of five years, these scholars argue that
the punishment amounts to a life sentence and may be cruel or
disproportionate.115 The recent compassionate release of Abdelbaset
Ali Mohmed Al Megrani, convicted of involvement in the bombing of
Pan Am Flight 103 in the late 1980s, is illustrative of this sort of
argument.116 The Scottish Government allowed Al Megrani, suffering

112. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-5-3.1(a)(12) (West 2011) (noting imprisonment
that would endanger the defendant’s medical condition constitutes a mitigating factor).
113. Berry, supra note 98.
114. Id. at 885.
115. Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the
King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 628–29 (1991).
116. Lockerbie Bomber Freed From Jail, BBC NEWS (Aug. 20, 2009), http://news.bbc.co
.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/south_of_scotland/8197370.stm.
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from terminal prostate cancer and expected to live no more than three
months, to return to his native Libya to die.117
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide for a reduction in
sentence where the offender suffers from “an extraordinary physical
impairment . . . ; [for example,] in the case of a seriously infirm
defendant, home detention may be as efficient as, and less costly than,
imprisonment.”118 This provision has been applied to make departures
from the Guidelines where, for example, a white-collar offender in
extremely poor health was sentenced to probation and home detention
in lieu of incarceration because imprisoning the offender might cause
his death.119
Notably, there is another federal hardship provision, albeit one
not often used: in the event of “extraordinary and compelling”
terminal illness, debilitating physical condition, or death or
incapacitation of the only family member who is able to care for a
minor child, a prisoner may be released upon a motion by the director
of the Bureau of Prisons.120 In practice, the Bureau of Prisons has used
this “compassionate release” program extremely rarely and then only
for terminally ill inmates.121
3. Hardship for Offender’s Family or Other Third Parties
Compassionate release may be thought warranted when
incarceration of a parent could cause hardship to dependents: “[I]n
some situations, allowing an offender to care for his or her child could
supplement the rehabilitative process by providing the inmate with an
important responsibility. The impact on deterrence will be negligible
and, as a result, will not forbid mitigation in this context.”122
Both federal and state courts permit consideration of hardships
inflicted upon third parties. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines address
this concern, stating that “family ties and responsibilities are not
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be
warranted.” The Guidelines’ commentary explains that, in order to
117. Id.
118. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 (2011).
119. United States v. Coughlin, Crim. No. 06-20005, 2008 WL 313099, at *5 (W.D. Ark. Feb.
1, 2008); see also United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 662–63 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding
downward departure in sentencing for defendant who received a kidney transplant, for which he
must receive regular tests and medicines, and which also led to bone disease); Simon v. United
States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42–43 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (imposing a reduced sentence on an offender
suffering from severe medical conditions).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006).
121. Berry, supra note 98, at 866.
122. Id. at 887.
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make a departure based on such factors, a court should look to a
nonexhaustive list of factors, including danger to members of the
offender’s family as a result of the offense. Additionally, there are
explicit requirements for a departure based on loss of caretaking or
financial support.123 As noted above, both federal and state death
penalty cases have much looser evidentiary standards at sentencing;
as such, in many cases familial hardship is introduced as a mitigating
factor.124
The states generally allow for mitigation based on potential
harm to third parties caused by the extended incarceration of an
offender. Indiana’s Penal Code, for example, permits a sentence
mitigation if “[i]mprisonment of the person will result in undue
hardship to the person or the dependents of the person.”125 Note,
however, that the Indiana Supreme Court has held that mitigation is
not required in these circumstances: “Many persons convicted of
serious crimes have one or more children and, absent special
circumstances, trial courts are not required to find that imprisonment
will result in an undue hardship.”126 The use of third-party hardship
as a mitigating factor (and its accompanying interpretation) is
mirrored in many other states,127 though some states restrict the
mitigation to extraordinary circumstances. New Jersey, for example,
only allows a mitigation based on hardship when “having regard to the
character and condition of the defendant, [the court] is of the opinion
that his imprisonment would be a serious injustice which overrides
the need to deter such conduct by others.”128 This “serious injustice”
standard may only be met in extraordinary and unforeseen
circumstances.
There is some evidence that this XPF surreptitiously plays a
role in sentencing. In one 2007 study, trial judges in Pennsylvania
were presented with factorial surveys comprised of short vignettes
designed to test the judges’ sentencing decisions for offenders in
various familial roles (and whose punishments, it follows, would have

123. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (2011); id., cmt. n.1(c).
124. See, e.g., People v. Ochoa, 19 Cal. 4th 353, 456 (Cal. 1998) (“Sympathy for a defendant's
family is not a matter that a capital jury can consider in mitigation, but that family members
may offer testimony of the impact of an execution on them if by so doing they illuminate some
positive quality of the defendant's background or character.”).
125. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(10) (West 2011).
126. Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 1999).
127. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-5-3.1(a)(11) (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A1340.16(e)(17) (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-04(11) (West 2011).
128. State v. Roth, 471 A.2d 370, 383 (N.J. 1984).
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varying impacts on others).129 It was observed that judges were most
likely to give significant decreases in the likelihood of incarceration for
offenders in the role of caregiver (both “caregiver only” and “caregiver
as well as financial provider”).130 This effect was observed for offenders
of either sex for nearly all familial roles—the only familial role that
did not significantly reduce the likelihood of incarceration was
economic provider.131
4. Old Age
Youth is often taken as a consideration in criminal sentencing,
as mandated by juvenile-offender provisions and other considerations
specific to young offenders. Immaturity may prevent an appreciation
of the wrongfulness of one’s conduct and thereby undermine an
offender’s blameworthiness. Elderly offenders have no such claim to
make, yet there is some support for old age as a mitigator. Von Hirsch
and Ashworth, for example, have argued that age is a relevant
consideration in setting appropriate levels of punishment, since it may
take the prime years away from young offenders and may be unduly
burdensome on older offenders.132
In practice, many states seem to have allowed the use of age as
a factor in punishment.133 The Michigan Supreme Court has held that
“a ‘term of years’ must be an indeterminate sentence less than life. It
must be something that is reasonably possible for a defendant actually
to serve.”134 Importantly, however, this holding does not require that a
court make a factual determination as to how long an offender is
expected to live; it is only a general requirement for courts to
consider.135 One study found that Pennsylvania judges were less likely
to incarcerate older offenders and that older offenders received shorter
129. Tina L. Freiburger, The Effects of Gender, Family Status, and Race on Sentencing
Decisions, 28 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 378, 382-84 (2009).
130. Id. at 386–87.
131. Id. at 387. Strangely, black males received a significant reduction in likelihood of
incarceration for having children and not offering to care for them. Id. at 390. This observation
may be explained, in part, by judge’s hesitance to participate in the surveys at all due to the
inclusion of race; the study’s author posited that this nonfamilial reduction in sentence may be
evidence of overcompensation on the part of judges to ensure that a racial bias was not observed.
Id. at 391.
132. ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND PENAL POLICY 276–77 (1983) (arguing that
equality of impact means that both older and younger offenders should receive a sentencing
discount because of the special hardships prison would entail).
133. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-04(12) (West 2011) (noting that “whether the
defendant is elderly or in poor health” should be taken into consideration).
134. People v. Moore, 439 N.W.2d 684, 693 (Mich. 1989).
135. Id.
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sentences than their younger counterparts; however, the study offered
little insight as to the causes of this discrepancy.136 Other studies have
reached “conflicting conclusions” about the impact of old age on
punishment.137
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines state that “age may be a
reason to depart downward in a case in which the defendant is elderly
and infirm and where a form of punishment such as home
confinement might be equally efficient as and less costly than
incarceration.”138 At least two circuits have narrowly interpreted this
provision, both of which require all four elements (age, infirmity,
efficiency, and cost effectiveness) in order to allow a reduced
sentence.139 Even within other, less strict circuits, the provision is
rather rarely used.140
While several jurisdictions allow the use of age as a mitigating
factor on a discretionary basis, at least one state explicitly forbids its
consideration unless it has a direct implication for an offender’s
blameworthiness. Arizona courts have held that “extreme youth or old
age only becomes a mitigating factor when, because of immaturity or
senility, the defendant lacks substantial judgment in committing the
crime.”141 The Tennessee Supreme Court has come to a similar
conclusion based on a sentencing guideline much like Arizona’s.142
That court’s pronouncement only allows the consideration of old age as
a punishment factor where age might implicate the offender’s ability
to “appreciate the nature of his conduct” and requires that age be
viewed in context, considering “education, maturity, experience,
mental capacity or development.”143

136. William E. Adams, Jr., The Intersection of Elder Law and Criminal Law: More Traffic
Than One Might Assume, 30 STETSON L. REV. 1331, 1346 (2001) (citing Darrell Steffensmeier &
Mark Motivans, Sentencing the Older Offender: Is There an "Age Bias"?, in ELDERS, CRIME, AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: MYTH, PERCEPTIONS, AND REALITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 185,
197–99 (Max B. Rothman et al. eds., 2000)). Similar results were observed in the federal courts,
despite the stricter guidelines applicable there.
137. Id. at 1346–47 (citing William E. Adams, Jr., The Incarceration of Older Criminals:
Balancing Safety, Cost, and Humanitarian Concerns, 19 NOVA L. REV. 465, 477–78 (1994)).
138. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1 (2011).
139. See Thomas A. Long, Note, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Elderly Offenders:
Walking a Tightrope Between Uniformity and Discretion (and Slipping), 2 ELDER L.J. 69, 75–76
(1994) (noting that the Third and Seventh Circuits require all four elements to be met).
140. Id. at 73.
141. State v. de la Garza, 675 P.2d 295, 296 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), disapproved of on other
grounds by State v. Thurlow, 712 P.2d 929, 932 (Ariz. 1986).
142. State v. Adams, 864 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tenn. 1993).
143. Id.
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5. Payment of Substantial Civil Compensation to the Victim
Judges often adjust punishment in light of civil payments when
the punishment is a fine or restitution. Indeed, when courts impose
restitution orders, it is settled practice that they should offset the
amount with “payments actually made by the defendant to the
victim,”144 though the fact that a civil proceeding is pending is
insufficient to reduce punishment.145 State courts often are statutorily
authorized to mitigate sentences in light of substantial civil
compensation.146
When pecuniary punishments are not solely at issue, federal
courts under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines have been hostile to the
argument that restitution should reduce punishment. Allowing
restitution to influence the sentencing decision, courts fear, may allow
socioeconomic considerations to seep into the sentencing process.147 As
the Sixth Circuit has noted, courts “may not sentence a poor convict
more harshly than a rich convict simply because the rich convict is
better able to make restitution.”148
Still, federal courts have acknowledged payment of civil
compensation as a mitigating factor under section 3E1.1(a) of the
Sentencing Guidelines on the theory that such payments demonstrate

144. CATHARINE M. GOODWIN ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION § 14:7 (2010); see also
18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2) (2006) (“Any amount paid to a victim under an order of restitution shall be
reduced by any amount later recovered as compensatory damages for the same loss by the victim
in . . . any Federal civil proceeding; and . . . any State civil proceeding, to the extent provided by
the law of the State.”).
145. See GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 144, § 14.8 (“Even where a pending civil judgment or
settlement is for the same harm as the restitution, courts generally disregard it in imposing
restitution, because such a judgment might be subsequently changed, appealed, or amended.”).
146. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155(d)(8) (West 2011) (mitigating factor if defendant
“fully compensated or made a good faith effort to fully compensate the victim”); CAL. R. CT.
4.423(b)(5) (West 2011) (including defendant making restitution to the victim as a mitigating
factor); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.16(e)(5) (West 2011) (introducing a mitigating factor for
defendant that has “made substantial or full restitution”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32.04(6)
(West 2011) (“[D]efendant has made or will make restitution . . . to the victim of his conduct for
the damage or injury which was sustained.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(5) (West 2011)
(“[D]efendant compensated or made a good faith attempt to compensate victim.”).
147. See United States v. Chastain, 84 F.3d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Allowing a sentencing
judge to reduce a defendant's sentence to preserve a defendant’s job and facilitate restitution
would introduce precisely the type of socio economic disparity into sentencing that the
Guidelines were designed to eliminate.”).
148. United States v. DeMonte, 25 F.3d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1994); see also United States v.
Grasser, 312 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Allowing sentencing courts to depart downward
based on a defendant’s ability to make restitution . . . would . . . create an unconstitutional
system where the rich could in effect buy their way out of prison sentences.” (quoting United
States v. Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380, 1389 (7th Cir. 1994))).
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“acceptance of responsibility for [the defendant’s] offense.”149 On this
theory compensation is not a sign of hardship, but rather an
acknowledgment of guilt, and courts accordingly require the
defendant’s restitution to be accompanied by genuine expressions of
sincerity. For instance, in United States v. Szarwark, the government
succeeded in challenging the District Court’s two-level reduction
under section 3E1.1(a) when the defendant, who was convicted of mail
fraud, failed to collect money owed to him by the victim after the
victim discovered the fraud.150 The Seventh Circuit noted that the
defendant’s asserted restitution was “clearly not what the framers of
the Sentencing Guidelines meant by voluntary payment.”151 By
contrast, in United States v. Oligmueller, the Eighth Circuit upheld a
downward departure when the defendant there voluntarily began
paying back a fraudulent loan more than a year before he was
indicted, worked sixteen-hour days, turned over his life insurance
deposit, took an outside job, and gave up his home all in order to
redeem the debt.152
E. Conclusion
To conclude, the XPF discussions above suggest that, without
guidance on the matter, different decisionmakers commonly can come
to widely different views on whether to adjust punishment for an XPF.
Such fundamental disagreements invite the common practice of
basing the offender’s punishment less on the offense committed, on the
offender’s blameworthiness for it, or on any rational crime-control
policy and more on the defendant’s good or bad luck in drawing a
decisionmaker.
Much of what has been said above about reliance on XPFs has
focused on courts and sentencing. This is so because it is only in this
context that we can see XPFs in use, usually through appellate review
or through the articulation of sentencing guidelines or policy
statements. However, there is good reason to believe that the diversity
of views on XPFs that we see among judges is found as well, perhaps
with even greater diversity, among the other decisionmakers in the
criminal justice process, especially those whose decisions are subject
to less scrutiny or guidance. The less visible decisions by police
149. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (2011); see also id. cmt. n.1(c) (“In
determining whether a defendant qualifies under subsection (a), appropriate considerations
include . . . voluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudication of guilt . . . .”).
150. 168 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1999).
151. Id.
152. United States v. Oligmueller, 198 F.3d 669, 670 (8th Cir. 1999).

2b. Robinson_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2012]

EXTRALEGAL PUNISHMENT FACTORS

4/27/2012 1:59 PM

767

officers, prosecutors, jurors, parole boards, and clemency panels may
take account of all, or none, of these XPFs. That is, not only is there
little or no guidance for taking account of XPFs, there is little or no
information about whether or how decisionmakers do take account of
them.
One final point is worth mentioning. Although each of the
factors discussed above is described on its own, in practice many may
arise in combination with one or more other factors. An example may
be the likelihood that a truly remorseful offender may apologize to his
victim and may publicly acknowledge his wrongdoing. Such apologies
also may be accompanied by victim forgiveness and possibly a victim
request for reduced punishment.
The occurrence of multiple factors together is not unusual. In
the Australian case of Hodder v. The Queen,153 for example, the
Supreme Court of Western Australia was confronted with at least
eight XPFs at once. The defendant brutally beat and repeatedly
sodomized his wife after a night of drinking, threatening to kill her if
she told the police.154 Once detained, Hodder admitted his offenses,
expressed remorse, and apologized for what he had done.155 He sought
out assistance from Alcoholics Anonymous and brought his alcoholism
in check.156 His wife, pregnant with a third child by the time of
sentencing, wrote an impassioned letter on his behalf, expressing her
forgiveness for her husband and noting both his good character and
her confidence that the incident was an isolated one.157 She added, “It
might hurt him to go to jail, but the person most affected would be me,
as I’m pregnant without any family here whatsoever and can’t really
see myself coping financially or emotionally.”158 At sentencing she
gave testimony reiterating her request that Hodder receive no jail
time.159 Thus, in addition to assessing punishment based on Hodder’s
blameworthiness, the sentencing judge could have also considered his
acknowledgment of guilt, expression of remorse, apology, prior good
character, efforts at rehabilitation, obligation to his family,
forgiveness of the victim, and the victim’s specific request for reduced
punishment. The sentencing judge nonetheless gave Hodder three
years imprisonment.160 However, the Supreme Court of Western
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

(1995) 81 A Crim R 88, 1995 WL 1689433 (Austl.).
Id. at 89–90.
Id. at 90, 92.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 95.
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Australia substituted it with a term of probation.161 The Chief Judge
of the Court concluded, “In my view, of all the cases which have so far
come before this Court, this one . . . fall[s] within the exceptional
circumstances in which a non-custodial disposition was justified.”162
It is also possible that particular XPFs may have particular
interactive effect with other XPFs. For example, either a remorseless
apology or true remorse (without apology) might persuade a judge to
give a reduced sentence, but a remorseful apology might be far more
effective. Similarly, an offender’s bad character might be outweighed
considerably by his potential for rehabilitation, but less so by
obligations to his family (where, for example, the offender appears to
be a poor influence on his children). Thus, a decisionmaker’s judgment
is likely to be a tough one if competing considerations are at issue—
which, in practice, may be fairly often. Given this reality, the need for
conceptual clarity in understanding XPFs, which has heretofore been
lacking, is especially weighty.
II. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF LAY INTUITIONS REGARDING EXTRALEGAL
PUNISHMENT FACTORS
We undertook a study of lay people’s intuitions regarding
XPFs, investigating whether and to what extent such factors influence
lay judgments about how much punishment offenders should receive.
Our study was designed to elicit a basic understanding of the way in
which people intuit XPFs and to build a foundation for additional
research.
A. Previous Studies
No study has taken a comprehensive approach to lay intuition
regarding punishment factors generally, though researchers have
sometimes studied how people understand particular factors. For
instance, studies historically have shown that remorse, apology, and
acknowledgment of guilt have had an effect on how people perceive
deserved punishment.163 When Alayna Jehle, Monika Miller, and
Markus Kemmelmeier took up these factors in a 2008 study, however,
161. Id. at 104–05.
162. Id. at 104.
163. See AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 111–17 (2004); Gregg J. Gold & Bernard Weiner,
Remorse, Confession, Group Identity and Expectancies about Repeating a Transgression, 22
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291, 292 (2000); Steven. J. Scher & John M. Darley, How
Effective Are the Things People Say to Apologize? Effects of the Realization of the Apology Speech
Act, 26 J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 127, 128 (1997).
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they found that displays of remorse had little effect on punishment,
even when accompanied by excuse or justification, and may have led
to increases in punishment when no account of the offender’s actions
was offered.164 The Miller study may be distinguishable, however,
since it asked participants to play the unique role of juror, possibly
leading them to perceive remorse differently, even as evidence of
deception.165
Similarly, many have studied offenders’ statuses and
characters, especially as they relate to punishment.166 Studies often
appear to collapse these factors into one characteristic: social
attractiveness.167 These studies of social attractiveness test many
aspects of an offender’s character germane to a typical sentencing
inquiry, including career status, politeness, and volunteerism.168
David Lady and Elliot Aronson found that socially unattractive
offenders received harsher sentences for the same conduct than
socially attractive or neutral offenders.169 Sentences selected for
socially attractive and neutral offenders were not different with any
statistical significance from each other.170 Nona Barnett and Hubert
Field tested offender character more fully in a 1978 study.171 There,
offender character was operationalized in a cleaner fashion, avoiding
the effects of extraneous factors.172 The study further explored the
164. See, e.g., Alayna Jehle, Monika K. Miller & Markus Kemmelmeier, The Influence of
Accounts and Remorse on Mock Jurors’ Judgments of Offenders, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 393, 400
(2008).
165. Id. at 402. This may also have been caused by some of the mannerisms utilized by the
actor featured in the mock trial videos—the actor was, in fact, attempting to deceive the jury.
166. See, e.g., Mark D. Alicke & Ethan Zell, Social Attractiveness and Blame, 39 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 2089, 2100–02 (2009); Nona J. Barnett & Hubert S. Field, Character of the
Defendant and Length of Sentence in Rape and Burglary Crimes, 104 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 271, 275–
76 (1978); Robert M. Bray et al., The Effects of Defendant Status on the Decisions of Student and
Community Juries, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 256, 257–59 (1978); David Landy & Elliot Aronson, The
Influence of the Character of the Criminal and His Victim on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors, 5
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141, 148–52 (1969).
167. Social attractiveness is also used interchangeably with “likeability.” See Alicke & Zell,
supra note 166, at 2090. These characteristics can be operationalized as combinations of career
status, politeness, and willingness to assist others. See id. at 2091–92 (listing descriptors used to
influence respondents’ assessments of social attractiveness); Landy & Aronson, supra note 166,
at 148 (including additional likely problematic factors, such as criminal history and injury
sustained during offense).
168. Landy & Aronson, supra note 166, at 145, 147–48.
169. Id. at 151.
170. Id.
171. Barnett & Field, supra note 166.
172. Barnett and Field provided mock jurors with similar case facts, but randomly assigned
offender biographies that altered social attractiveness, gender, and race. Id. at 273. The socially
attractive condition was tested by describing the offender as a middle-aged stockbroker in a local
firm who had maintained the same position for 10.5 years, was well liked by coworkers, was
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differing effects of offender character on punishment awards for
different types of crime, providing vignettes of both rape and
burglary.173 As might be expected, socially unattractive offenders
received significantly longer prison terms than their socially attractive
analogs when both were presented as having committed a rape.174
Oddly, however, there was no significant difference in assigned
sentences between offenders of differing character for the burglary
offense.175 This research suggests that the effects of these XPFs may
be mediated by other, more traditionally legal factors, such as offense
type.176 In a further exploration of the effect of offender character on
assignment of blame, Mark Alicke and Ethan Zell moved away from
the mock-jury methodology and instead focused on the presentation of
compact vignettes.177 Their study provided student respondents with a
vignette involving an assault and included information about the
offender’s social attractiveness.178 The study confirmed that social
attractiveness has an effect on assignment of blame: socially attractive
offenders are blamed less than unattractive offenders, though
attractiveness did not influence perceived causation of the underlying
crime.179
At least one prior study examined punishment judgments for
offenders with exceptional talents.180 In an investigation of factors
that may have led to the acquittal of O.J. Simpson, Paul Skolnick and
Jerry Shaw tested both offender race and status to evaluate whether
one or both may have contributed to that trial’s outcome.181 The study
tested offender status by presenting either a famous, award-winning
author or an unsuccessful, poorly received author to simulated juries.
Mock jurors were then asked to assign punishment.182 Analysis of the
married, and had three children. Id. The socially unattractive condition described the offender as
a middle-aged janitor in a local office building who had held the job for only 4.5 weeks and was
known to change jobs often, was not well known or liked, and was divorced (leaving three
children with a prior spouse). Id.
173. Id. at 273–74.
174. Id. at 275.
175. Id.
176. The Barnett and Field study also found no significant effect on punishment due to
offender gender or race, regardless of underlying crime, though this finding has been disputed by
other work. Id. But see Skolnick & Shaw, supra note 2, at 514–15 (finding a statistically
significant interaction between mock-juror race and offender race in punishment decisions).
177. Alicke & Zell, supra note 166, at 2093–95, 2098–99.
178. Id. at 2093–95.
179. Id. at 2096.
180. Skolnick & Shaw, supra note 2, at 503.
181. Id. at 506–09.
182. Id. at 506–07. While respondents were not told that the punishment of either author
would impact his future work and, in the case of the high-status offender, deprive society of
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participants’ judgments showed a statistically significant three-way
interaction between juror race, offender race, and offender status.183
For all combinations of juror and offender race, more responsibility for
the underlying crime was attributed to low-status offenders than to
high-status offenders.184
Several social scientists have looked at lay intuition regarding
offender hardship. For instance, Harold Sigall and David Landy
studied offender suffering in a 1972 study, which followed a more
comprehensive study conducted three years earlier.185 All participants
were told that an offender caused an automobile accident that killed
another person, and some participants were also told that the offender
lost sight in one eye before, during, or after the crime.186 The study
observed a statistically significant effect on punishment judgments
based upon the offender’s character, but reported that the offender’s
suffering was not an essential part of the relationship between
offender likeability and the punishment administered to him.187
Years later, William Austin revisited this issue by running
numerous studies to examine the effects of offender suffering, victim
suffering, and severity of underlying crime on punishment
judgments.188 Offenders were described as not suffering as a result of
the crime, suffering moderately, or suffering excessively (described as
experiencing permanent paralysis from the neck down as a result of

highly valued artistic contributions, this omission does not appear problematic. In a real-world
context, the future performance of an offender is unlikely to be known and, especially among
exceptionally talented offenders, may be eclipsed by celebrity. The effects of celebrity status on
criminal punishment were explored empirically in Jared Chamberlain, Monica K. Miller &
Alayna Jehle, Celebrities in the Courtroom: Legal Responses, Psychological Theory, and
Empirical Research, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 551 (2006).
183. Skolnick & Shaw, supra note 2, at 513.
184. Id.
185. Harold Sigall & David Landy, Effects of the Defendant's Character and Suffering on
Juridic Judgment: A Replication and Clarification, 88 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149 (1972).
186. Id. at 150.
187. Id.
188. William Austin, The Concept of Desert and Its Influence on Simulated Decision Makers'
Sentencing Decisions, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 163, 169 (1979). Austin pointed to explicit
invocation of Agnew’s prior suffering by then-Attorney General Elliot Richardson as a
justification for not imprisoning Agnew for tax fraud:
I am fully convinced that in all the circumstances leniency is justified. I am keenly
aware, first of the historic magnitude of the penalties inherent in the vice president’s
resignation from his high office and his acceptance of a judgment of conviction for a
felony. To propose that a man who has suffered these penalties should, in addition, be
incarcerated . . . is more than I as head of the government’s prosecuting arm, can
recommend or wish.
Id.
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actions taken during the commission of the crime).189 Offender
suffering reduced the assigned sentences for offenders in a pursesnatching vignette, with higher reductions observed for increased
suffering.190 Less effect was observed for offender suffering, however,
as the seriousness of the underlying crime increased.191 The study
showed no significant difference in sentence between the no-suffering
and moderate-suffering conditions for offenders guilty of more severe
offenses, although a significant difference remained between
sentences for the moderate- and excessive-suffering conditions.192
In a separate, concurrent study, Austin went further and
tested the effects of the relevance of offender suffering on
punishment.193 He varied the circumstance in which the offender was
injured—either during his arrest (crime relevant) or while out on bail
awaiting trial (crime irrelevant).194 Intriguingly, there was no
difference in effect on sentence between crime-relevant and irrelevant
suffering.195 Similarly, no change in effect was observed when the type
of suffering was changed from physical injury to nonphysical
suffering.196 Ultimately, Austin concluded that the participants in his
study were in most cases eager to “temper justice with mercy” and
reduce sentences for suffering offenders, but he noted that this
“mercy” may simply be a reflection of the diminished amount of
suffering an offender still deserves.197
In a later study of offender suffering, David Shaffer and others
duplicated much of Austin’s methodology.198 Unlike Austin’s study,
however, Shaffer’s study examined the differing effects of jury
dogmatism (referring to the belief in a “just world” where individuals
naturally receive deserved punishments) on punishment for offenders
who suffered for reasons related to the crime as well as those who

189. Id. at 174.
190. Id. at 176.
191. Id. at 177.
192. Id. at 177–78.
193. Id. at 182.
194. Id.
195. Id. Notably, the sample size was too small to achieve statistical significance.
196. Id. at 184. For nonphysical suffering, the moderate suffering condition included the
offender’s father suffering a minor heart attack, a suspension from the offender’s job, and the
offender’s wife filing for divorce. Id. In the excessive suffering condition, the offender’s father
suffered a severe heart attack and died, the offender was fired from his job, and the offender’s
wife successfully divorced him and took custody of his children. Id.
197. Id. at 187.
198. David R. Shaffer, Diane Plummer & Georgina Hammock, Hath He Suffered Enough?
Effects of Jury Dogmatism, Defendant Similarity, and Defendant’s Pretrial Suffering on Juridic
Decisions, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1059 (1986).
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suffered for reasons not related to the crime. In order to test for these
effects, Shaffer collected data from jurors about their personal values
after receiving their verdicts and sentences.199 While Austin observed
no change in sentence for “relevant” or “irrelevant” suffering, the
addition of jury dogmatism data illustrated that the type of suffering
does indeed affect juror’s decisions—it simply does so in a symmetrical
fashion based on jury dogmatism.200 Highly dogmatic juries gave
reduced sentences for crime-irrelevant suffering and increased
sentences for crime-relevant suffering, while low dogmatic juries did
the opposite.201
While little has been done on old age in particular,202 one
recent study by Christine Bergeron and Stuart McKelvie provided
second-degree murder and theft vignettes to participants and
informed them that the offender was either twenty, forty, or sixty
years old and had been found guilty of the underlying offense.203
Participants were asked to make sentencing and parole
recommendations for the offenders.204 The study found that the
twenty-year-old and the sixty-year-old were treated more leniently
than the forty-year-old.205 The nature of the offense, the offender’s age,
and the interaction between these two facts had a significant effect on
punishment,206 though the effect of age differed by crime.207 Bergeron
and McKelvie speculated that the results indicated either bias or
support for age as a “justifiable mitigating factor.”208

199. Id. at 1061–62.
200. Id. at 1063.
201. Id.
202. L. Beth Gaydon & Monica K. Miller, Elders in the Justice System: How the System
Treats Elders in Trials, During Imprisonment, and on Death Row, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 677, 682–
83 (2007) (noting the lack of research on sentences for elder offenders).
203. Christine E. Bergeron & Stuart J. McKelvie, Effects of Defendant Age on Severity of
Punishment for Different Crimes, 144 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 75, 81 (2004).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 86.
206. See id. at 84 (finding, among other results, that sentences were shorter for theft than for
murder and were shorter for both the twenty-year-olds and sixty-year-olds than for the fortyyear-olds).
207. See id. (finding that the effect of age only produced significant differences in sentencing
recommendations for murder).
208. Id. at 88.
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B. Methodology
Our survey employed the Qualtrics survey software package.209
In the survey, subjects were presented with five different “baseline
scenarios,” each describing the circumstances of a hypothetical
criminal offense. We developed the baseline scenarios to showcase
different kinds of offenses; each of the five scenarios consisted of a
simple paragraph-long narrative that focused on the offense while
avoiding offender characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, or
personality. These narratives, which the subjects read verbatim
during the course of the survey, are set out in Table 1 below.

Type

TABLE 1. BASELINE SCENARIOS
Text

Scenario A:
Theft with
Trespass

John does not have all the tools he needs for his workshop but
knows of a family two streets over who sometimes leaves
unlocked the door to the detached garage next to their house.
When he next sees his chance, he enters the detached garage
through the unlocked door and takes a medium size electric drill,
intending to keep it forever.

Scenario B:
Personal
Injury

Angry after overhearing another parent’s remarks during a
soccer match in which Alex’s son is playing, Alex approaches the
man after the game, grabs his coffee mug, knocks him down,
then kicks him several times while he is on the ground, knocking
him out for several minutes and causing cuts that require five
stitches.

Scenario C:
Government
al Corruption

David is the mayor of a moderately sized city, and is charged
with deciding between competing bids for the management of a
youth detention facility. Company A has submitted the lowest
bid, and is a reputable company that provides services to
numerous other cities in the state. However, Company B’s CEO
recently visited David and offered him $5,000 in exchange for
awarding the contract to his company, which has a long record of
improper treatment of juveniles and has submitted a much
higher bid. David takes the cash and gives the job to Company B.
David is convicted of governmental corruption.

209. See QUALTRICS, http://www.qualtrics.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2011) (providing online
resources for survey creation, distribution, and reporting).
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Type

Text

Scenario D:
Causing
Death by
Risk Taking

Two vicious pit bulls that Brian keeps for illegal dog fighting
have just learned to escape and have attacked a person who came
to Brian’s house. The police tell Brian he must destroy the dogs.
Brian tells the police that he will, but does not actually intend to
do so. The next day, the dogs escape again and maul to death a
man delivering a package.

Scenario E:
Intentional
Killing with
Abduction

A woman at work reveals Mark’s misdeeds to his employer,
thereby getting him fired. Mark devises a plan to get even with
her. The next week he forces the woman into his car at knife
point and drives her to a secluded area where he shoots her to
death.

During the survey, subjects worked with one scenario at a
time. For each scenario, they were first instructed to read the scenario
narrative and then were asked to report their intuitive judgments
about how much punishment the offender deserved for his crimes.
Subjects answered using the scale set out in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1. SCALE USED BY SUBJECTS TO ASSIGN PUNISHMENT TO
HYPOTHETICAL OFFENDERS

N.B.: Moving one gray dash to the right doubles punishment. Moving one gray dash to
the left halves it.

After marking their judgments on this scale, subjects were
given additional facts and were asked whether those facts should have
any effect on the amount of punishment imposed. Subjects were shown
one fact at a time, each fact corresponding to an XPF. When subjects
answered “yes,” they accessed the scale in Figure 1 and were
instructed to indicate new punishment assignments. Baseline
assignments were marked for reference.
Time markings on the scale are exponential, not linear. The
hash marks below the line indicate the regular intervals of the scale,
with each hash mark indicating a doubling or halving of punishment
relative to the hash mark before or after it. Subjects did not have to
figure out this exponential scale; they could look at the time scale

2b. Robinson_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

776

4/27/2012 1:59 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:3:737

marked above the line. Above-the-line marks correspond to grading
levels typical of American criminal codes.210
The subjects’ assignments of absolute liability were of little
interest in this study;211 rather, the focus here was on the willingness
of the respondents to adjust their original punishment assignments in
light of each separate XPF. The distance between any two hash marks
(or, in fact, any two equivalent distances on the scale) is always equal
in relative terms, corresponding to an increase or decrease in
punishment. That is, no matter where one is on the scale, one
additional hash mark is equal to a doubling of punishment. Hence,
intersubject comparison by change in punishment, expressed as
distance traveled on the scale, is meaningful.
Our results are reported throughout as changes in respondents’
exponential scale numbers (“ESNs”). For example, an ESN change of
+1 reflects a doubling of punishment from that originally given in the
baseline scenario, and a change of -1 constitutes a halving of
punishment, while a change of +2, by contrast, represents a
quadrupling of punishment.212

ESN Value
% Change in
Punishment
ESN Value
% Change in
Punishment

-1

TABLE 2. ESN SCALE
-0.8 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 0
0.2 0.4

50

57

66

71

76

87

-3

-2.5

-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

13

18

25

35

50

71

0.5

0.6

0.8

1

100 115 132 141 152 174 200
0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

100 141 200 283 400 566 800

We constructed a series of facts that depicted the eighteen
XPFs discussed in Part I. Each fact could plausibly prompt a
respondent to depart from her baseline assignment of punishment.
These facts are set out in Table 3.

210. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/books/
jlb/.
211. While perhaps agreeing on the relative blameworthiness rankings of at least “core
crimes,” subjects do not necessarily agree on absolute punishment levels. See Robinson & Darley,
Intuitions, supra note 3, at 8 (proposing that empirical data refutes the assumption that people’s
intuitions of justice are subject to disagreement because studies have shown a broad consensus
about the relative blameworthiness of different types of crimes).
212. These values were derived as follows: the relationship between years of punishment and
pixel position (p) is equal to 86.562 × ln(p) + 275.587. Using this equation, the percentage
difference in punishment indicated by a distance of d pixels is equal to e (d/86.562).
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TABLE 3. EXTRALEGAL PUNISHMENT FACTOR VARIATIONS
XPF

Scenario Text
A. Offender Reaction to the Offense

1. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt

During a court hearing, the offender publicly acknowledges
that he committed the offense, and enters a plea of guilty.

2. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt plus Apology

At a hearing in court, the offender publicly acknowledges that
he committed the offense, enters a plea of guilty, and, on
advice of counsel, publicly apologizes to his victims, who are
present in court.

3. Truly Remorseful with
Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt and Apology

Sincerely remorseful about what he has done, the offender
publicly acknowledges during a court hearing that he
committed the offense, and pleads guilty. He publicly
apologizes to his victims, who are present in court.

4. True Remorse, Public
Acknowledgment of Guilt,
and Apology Immediately
After Offense

Soon after the offense, the offender feels sincerely remorseful.
While he is unable to undo his actions, he goes to his victims
and apologizes. He turns himself into police, even though it is
unlikely they would have caught him otherwise.

B. Victim or Public Reaction to the Offense
5. Forgiveness by Victim

The victims, who are very religious people, have forgiven the
offender for his offense.

6. Victim Wants Less or No
Punishment

The victims, who are very religious people, want the offender’s
sentence for his offense to be substantially reduced.

7. Victim Wants More
Punishment

The victims have expressed outrage over the offender’s crime.
They believe a lenient sentence will trivialize the offender’s
crime and the suffering he has caused and insist that he
receive more severe punishment.

8. Public Outrage over Offense

After the offense, there is a good deal of news coverage about
the offender’s actions and their effects. The public expresses
outrage over the offender’s offense and demands that he
receive harsher punishment.

C. Offender Status or Characteristics Unrelated to Commission of the Offense
9. Rehabilitated

Through his participation in a rehabilitation program, the
offender has come to appreciate the extent of the harm he
caused, has changed his view about victimizing others, and is
unlikely to commit a similar offense in the future.

10. Good Deeds Before Offense

For a year prior to his offense, the offender volunteered nearly
every weekend to work at a homeless shelter and a charity
soup kitchen.

11. Good Deeds After Offense

For the year between the offender’s offense and his conviction,
the offender volunteers nearly every weekend at a homeless
shelter and a charity soup kitchen.
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XPF

Scenario Text

12. Bad Deeds or Character

The offender is an avowed racist who has openly preached his
views of racial supremacy and advocated policies that promote
racial purity and segregation, including the prohibition of
mixed-race marriages. His racism played no role in his offense.

13. Special Talents

The offender is a world-famous and extremely talented actor
who has won many awards for his work, which is known
particularly for touching and changing people’s lives. His work
has not only inspired many people, but also advanced the
cause of art generally. Critics have marked the offender as
likely to have a long and stellar career.
D. Suffering Apart from Official Punishment

14. Already Suffering as a
Result of the Offense

After the offense, the offender falls during his escape. As a
result of his neck injuries, the offender will be paralyzed from
the neck down for the rest of his life.

15. Has Already Paid
Substantial Civil
Compensation to the
Victim

After the offender’s conviction, but before his sentencing, the
offender is found liable for his offense in a civil lawsuit, and
pays his victims compensatory damages as well as special
damages totaling three times compensatory damages.

16. Hardship for Offender’s
Family or Others

The offender’s child has a serious disease that requires daily
care and attention. Because the offender’s wife is dead and he
has no other living family, either the offender must provide
the care or the child will be put in state custody. The extent of
his punishment will affect how much care and support he can
give to his child.

17. Hardship for Offender
Himself

Several weeks after the offense, the offender is in an
automobile accident. As a result of neck injuries, he will be
paralyzed from the neck down for the rest of his life.

18. Old Age

At the time of the offense, the offender is eighty years old and
in poor health. A person in his condition may not have long to
live.

Once subjects had the chance to revise the assignments, a new
XPF fact was given. The instructions made clear that each of these
alternative variations on the baseline scenario were to be considered
independently of each other. The order in which the variations were
presented was randomized. Moreover, respondents did not encounter
every XPF in the study. About half of the respondents were randomly
assigned to a survey that tested only the XPFs listed in Groups A and
D; the other half were randomly assigned to a survey that tested the
XPFs listed in Groups B and C. Thus, every respondent considered
nine punishment factors per baseline scenario. They also repeated the
process for all five scenarios, for a total of forty-five variations.
Additionally, each subject answered six demographic questions that
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were interspersed throughout the survey to provide a change of pace
and to ensure attentiveness. On average, subjects took thirteen
minutes to complete the survey.
As a quality-control measure, each survey included five
questions designed to ensure that participants were paying
attention.213 If subjects failed the quality-control check, all of their
answers for that baseline scenario were eliminated from the data pool.
However, for practical as well as empirical reasons, we did not throw
out whole surveys for one failed check question. In some cases,
subjects provided useful data for three or four of the scenarios but
became unreliable as they reached the end of the survey.214
We were aware that a “demand effect” might have biased
participants, so the instructions made it clear that a “no change”
response was entirely acceptable. In fact, 71.8% of all responses were
for “no change.”215 Moreover, 23.3% of the time respondents did not
record a change for any XPF in a given scenario.216 With these trends
in mind, there seems little reason to be concerned about a demand
effect.
Data were collected from two different subject pools, which we
hoped would strengthen the reliability of the results. The first data
source used subjects recruited through flyers and an email listserv at
the University of Chicago. Participants were brought into a quiet
laboratory in downtown Chicago where they were organized into small
groups (usually one to three per group). They were then brought into a
computer lab where they completed the study in return for three
dollars. Subjects completed the surveys individually, at their own
paces. All submissions were done anonymously.
The second data collection source was a national sample
available via the Internet on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.217 This
213. For example, in one of these screening questions subjects were told that the offender
died before sentencing and that they should answer “No Punishment” to the scale question after
marking “Yes” to the change-in-punishment question.
214. In fact, subjects failing the Scenario A check question, for example, were 30% more
likely to answer “no change” to any particular question than were subjects who did not fail the
check. Because answering more questions with “no change” reduces the length of the survey
(selecting “no change” for all questions would reduce the length of the survey by half because the
subject is then presented with no scale questions), we can assume that subjects failing the
quality-control check questions were attempting to quickly finish the survey. However, this
would not impugn their earlier answers for which they did not fail the check question.
215. Out of 16,749 recorded responses, 12,018 were “no change” (71.8%).
216. Counting each scenario separately, respondents ran through a set of XPF questions
1,861 times. Respondents did not record any change to their initial punishment assignment 434
times (23.3%).
217. See generally Welcome, AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.
mturk.com/mturk/welcome (advertising Mechanical Turk as a marketplace for businesses and
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system coordinates a large pool of paid volunteers who perform tasks
over the Internet (including many other tasks besides surveys) for a
wide range of “requesters.” In this study, subjects recruited through
Mechanical Turk were paid $1.60 for completing the survey. The
Qualtrics survey program mirrored the program employed in Chicago,
though due to the nature of Mechanical Turk, participants could take
the survey on their own personal computers. Submissions here were
also kept anonymous. In general, our data show consistency across the
two subject pools.218
The combined subject pool of 423 people (173 from Chicago and
250 from Mechanical Turk) displayed a broad range of demographics.
Women comprised 58.6% of the pool and 75.3% of subjects were
unmarried, divorced, or separated. Whites made up 66.9% of the
sample, while 17.4% of the participants were black, 6.6% were Asian,
and 4.3% were Latino. The remaining 4.5% consisted of other ethnic
groups. The average subject’s age was 29.6 years old, varying by a
standard deviation of 11.4 years; the minimum age allowed was 18.
Additionally, most subjects had completed some college or had
obtained a two- or four-year degree (36.6%, 11.4%, and 25.2%,
respectively); 12.1% had either a high school degree or no degree,
while 14.8% had an advanced graduate degree. Average income was
$52,262, with a standard deviation of $34,588.
Once data collection was completed, we computed two values.
The first, which we refer to as “XPF popularity,” is the percentage of
respondents that changed their initial punishment assignment in light
of the XPF in question. The second, which we refer to as “XPF
magnitude,” is the amount by which respondents on average altered
their initial punishment assignment. We calculated XPF magnitude
based on the ESNs reported in the survey, with a response of “no
change” averaged into the value as 0.219 Whenever an XPF magnitude
value is reported, a negative ESN connotes mitigation in punishment
and a positive ESN connotes an aggravation of punishment.220

developers to access a workforce for thousands of individual tasks). Researchers who have
studied Amazon's Mechanical Turk system have found that American Mechanical Turk
participants on average bear a close resemblance to the U.S. population at large. See Michael
Buhrmester et al., Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality,
Data? 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 4 (2011) (suggesting that Mechanical Turk participants are
more demographically diverse than standard internet samples).
218. See infra Part II.F (evaluating the impact of several variables on XPF popularity).
219. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
220. Note that three of the eighteen XPFs were designed to be aggravators: XPF 7 (“Victim
Wants More Punishment”), XPF 8 (“Public Outrage over Offense”), and XPF 12 (“Bad Deeds or
Character”).

2b. Robinson_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2012]

4/27/2012 1:59 PM

EXTRALEGAL PUNISHMENT FACTORS

781

C. Support for Adjusting Punishment in Light of Extralegal
Punishment Factors
Table 4 reports the average punishment given for each baseline
scenario (in other words, without consideration of any XPF), with the
ESN-scale value translated into a term of imprisonment as it
appeared on the survey’s punishment scale.
TABLE 4. AVERAGE PUNISHMENT FOR EACH BASELINE SCENARIO
Scenarios:

Prison
Term in
Years

A.
Theft with
Trespass

B.
Personal
Injury

C.
Governmental
Corruption

1.0

1.3

6.1

D.
E.
Average
Causing Intentional
for All
Death by Killing and Baseline
Risk
Abduction Scenarios
Taking

14.2

49.7

14.5

Table 5 presents the results of the changes in punishment for
each XPF in each baseline scenario. The value in the top row within
each cell displays XPF popularity of each XPF in each baseline
scenario. The value in the bottom row of each cell reports the XPF
magnitude of each XPF in each baseline scenario. Summary figures
for each XPF across all scenarios are shown at the end of each row.221
Summary figures for each baseline scenario across all XPFs are
reported at the bottom of each column.222 The bottom-right cell shows
averages for all recorded data points.

221. “Row Averages” denotes (1) the percentage of responses that displayed a change in
punishment amount for each XPF across all scenarios, and (2) the average ESN value among all
responses to each XPF for all scenarios.
222. For each scenario, “Column Averages” denotes (1) the percentage of responses that
displayed a change in punishment amount after the respondent was shown each XPF, and (2) the
average ESN value recorded after the respondent was shown each XPF.
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TABLE 5. XPF POPULARITY AND MAGNITUDE, ORDERED BY
OVERALL POPULARITY
Scenarios
A.
Theft with
Trespass

B.
Personal
Injury

C.
Governmental
Corruption

D.
Causing
Death by
Risk Taking

E.
Intentional
Killing and
Abduction

Row
Averages

4. True Remorse,
Acknowledgment of Guilt, and
Apology Immediately After
Offense

76.9%
-0.94

65.6%
-0.66

70.8%
-1.15

48.7%
-0.51

40.1%
-0.33

60.5%
-0.72

9. Rehabilitated

52.5%
-0.32

51.4%
-0.26

41.8%
-0.29

42.9%
-0.32

30.9%
-0.26

44.0%
-0.29

15. Has Already Paid
Substantial Civil Compensation
to the Victim

64.6%
-0.88

53.3%
-0.62

44.3%
-0.68

28.4%
-0.24

14.1%
-0.04

41.0%
-0.49

3. Truly Remorseful with Public
Acknowledgment of Guilt and
Apology

52.3%
-0.42

47.7%
-0.36

37.9%
-0.37

28.4%
-0.21

20.8%
-0.11

37.5%
-0.29

16. Hardship for Offender’s
Family or Others

50.3%
-0.68

51.3%
-0.63

40.5%
-0.77

28.9%
-0.53

8.3%
-0.09

35.9%
-0.54

14. Already Suffering from His
Offense

46.2%
-0.76

37.4%
-0.37

28.2%
-0.49

39.6%
-0.81

14.1%
-0.36

33.2%
-0.56

2. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt plus Apology

44.6%
-0.39

42.1%
-0.29

29.7%
-0.24

20.3%
-0.14

14.6%
-0.04

30.3%
-0.22

17. Hardship for Offender
Himself

45.1%
-0.67

31.3%
-0.48

26.7%
-0.76

23.9%
-0.53

13.0%
-0.37

28.0%
-0.56

6. Victim Wants Less or No
Punishment

39.7%
-0.28

32.4%
-0.21

16.4%
-0.20

24.9%
-0.27

18.9%
-0.15

26.5%
-0.22

1. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt

32.3%
-0.20

35.2%
-0.19

25.6%
-0.20

21.8%
-0.15

15.6%
-0.05

26.2%
-0.16

18. Old Age

32.8%
-0.33

26.2%
-0.34

21.5%
-0.35

20.8%
-0.41

9.9%
-0.12

22.3%
-0.31

7. Victim Wants More
Punishment

19.6%
+0.09

19.0%
+0.11

24.9%
+0.05

23.2%
+0.07

15.4%
+0.00

20.4%
+0.06

11. Good Deeds After Offense

25.7%
-0.16

29.1%
-0.14

16.4%
-0.12

16.9%
-0.09

9.7%
-0.05

19.6%
-0.11

5. Forgiveness by Victim

31.3%
-0.25

22.5%
-0.29

13.0%
-0.07

16.4%
-0.19

12.0%
-0.10

19.1%
-0.18

12. Bad Deeds or Character

14.0%
+0.04

20.7%
+0.15

19.8%
+0.01

15.8%
+0.04

14.9%
+0.01

17.0%
+0.05

8. Public Outrage over Offense

16.2%
+0.09

17.3%
+0.06

16.9%
+0.00

14.7%
+0.16

12.6%
-0.03

15.6%
+0.05

10. Good Deeds Before Offense

20.1%
-0.08

20.1%
-0.11

15.2%
-0.18

11.9%
-0.05

7.4%
-0.04

15.0%
-0.07

13. Special Talents

14.0%
+0.12

12.3%
+0.03

10.7%
-0.02

10.2%
+0.02

5.7%
-0.03

10.6%
+0.02

Column Averages

37.7%
-0.33

34.2%
-0.26

27.8%
-0.32

24.3%
-0.23

15.4%
-0.12

27.9%
-0.25

XPFs

N.B.: XPF popularity values significantly greater than 50% (i.e., above the margin of
error)—thereby enjoying significant majority support—are bolded and italicized. Popularity
values at least within the margin of error are italicized.
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Table 6, organized in the same way as Table 5, gives in each
cell the mean ESN change among those participants who adjusted
punishment. In other words, we recalculated XPF magnitude values
so as to include only nonzero responses. As with Table 5, a negative
value means mitigation in punishment and a positive value means
aggravation in punishment.
TABLE 6. MEAN ESN CHANGES AMONG SUBJECTS
WHO ADJUSTED PUNISHMENT
Scenarios
A.
Theft with
Trespass

B.
Personal
Injury

C.
Governmental
Corruption

D.
Causing
Death by
Risk Taking

E.
Intentional
Killing and
Abduction

Row
Averages

4. True Remorse,
Acknowledgment of Guilt,
and Apology Immediately
After Offense

-1.23

-1.06

-1.63

-1.04

-0.83

-1.15

9. Rehabilitated

-0.62

-0.50

-0.68

-0.75

-0.83

-0.68

15. Has Already Paid
Substantial Civil
Compensation to the Victim

-1.37

-1.16

-1.52

-0.85

-0.30

-1.04

3. Truly Remorseful with
Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt and Apology

-0.80

-0.76

-0.96

-0.74

-0.51

-0.76

16. Hardship for Offender’s
Family or Others

-1.34

-1.23

-1.89

-1.83

-1.03

-1.46

14. Already Suffering from
His Offense

-1.64

-0.97

-1.74

-2.05

-2.52

-1.78

2. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt plus Apology

-0.88

-0.69

-0.82

-0.69

-0.26

-0.67

17. Hardship for Offender
Himself

-1.49

-1.52

-2.86

-2.23

-2.87

-2.19

6. Victim Wants Less or No
Punishment

-1.70

-0.65

-1.24

-1.09

-0.77

-0.89

1. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt

-0.62

-0.55

-0.76

-0.67

-0.33

-0.59

18. Old Age

-1.02

-1.30

-1.60

-1.97

-1.23

-1.42

7. Victim Wants More
Punishment

+0.45

+0.56

+0.18

+0.13

-0.02

+0.30

11. Good Deeds After Offense

-0.61

-0.48

-0.74

-0.56

-0.48

-0.57

XPFs

5. Forgiveness by Victim

-0.81

-1.29

-0.50

-1.14

-0.83

-0.91

12. Bad Deeds or Character

+0.58

+0.71

+0.05

+0.27

-0.07

+0.31

8. Public Outrage over
Offense

+0.52

+0.35

+0.01

+0.43

+0.24

+0.31

10. Good Deeds Before
Offense

-0.39

-0.52

-0.49

-0.43

-0.52

-0.47

13. Special Talents

+0.87

+0.26

-0.14

-0.17

-0.59

+0.05

Column Averages

-0.67

-0.54

-0.96

-0.85

-0.76

-0.75

The histogram in Figure 2 shows the distribution of ESN
values from all recorded responses. An overwhelming 71.8% of
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responses indicated “no change” and were recorded as 0. The
remaining 27.9% of responses were between +10 and -10, with the
responses having a negatively skewed unimodal distribution centered
on 0. Since only a few XPFs aggravated punishment,223 most ESN
values recorded were negative.224
FIGURE 2. FREQUENCY OF XPF ADJUSTMENT AMOUNTS
15,355

789

439

31
≤ -6.01

92
-6 to -3.01 -3 to -0.01 0 to 2.99

37
3 to 5.99

6 to 8.99

6
≥9

Size of XPF Adjustment Amount
In broadest outline, Table 5 suggests that there is indeed
support among lay people for punishment factors that have
traditionally been excluded from the criminal law’s liability and
punishment rules. Every XPF tested had some support, even in
relation to Scenario E (“Intentional Killing and Abduction”), the most
serious offense. A number of XPFs enjoyed the support of a majority of
study participants (those italicized in Table 5), with support reaching
as high as 77% for one XPF.225
It is equally true, however, that most XPFs do not have
majority support, even in Scenario A, which sets out the least serious
offense in the survey. In Scenario A, half of the XPFs had the support

223. XPFs 7, 8, and 12 were designed to be aggravators, and XPF 13 (“Special Talents”)
turned out to be one as well.
224. Individual histograms for each offense and XPF variation are on file with author.
225. XPF 4 under Scenario A.

2b. Robinson_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2012]

EXTRALEGAL PUNISHMENT FACTORS

4/27/2012 1:59 PM

785

of less than a third of the participants.226 Although as many as eight
XPFs may have enjoyed majority support, if the margin of error is
taken into account, only two unquestionably did.227 Scenario A, in fact,
was unlike other scenarios in this regard: only in two other instances
did an XPF command clear majority support.228 For Scenario E, the
most serious offense, only one XPF received the support of even a
third of study participants.229
D. Effect of Baseline Offense on XPF Adjustments to Punishment
The results suggest that XPF popularity and XPF magnitude
depend on the underlying offense at issue. The differences among
columns, including the column averages in the bottom row of Tables 5
and 6, show that both XPF popularity and magnitude decrease
substantially as the seriousness of the offense increases.230 Across all
XPFs, popularity drops from 38% in Scenario A to 15% in Scenario E,
reflecting a decline in support by more than half. In most instances,
the drop in popularity moves in a consistently downward progression
across the five baseline offenses as seriousness increases.
But this “offense effect” is not consistent for all XPFs.
Popularity for some of the least popular XPFs remains at the same low
level across all offenses.231 Some XPFs show a drop-off in popularity of
only a third,232 while two relatively popular XPFs exhibit a decline in
popularity of only a fifth.233 This inconsistency in the way in which
226. See supra Column A (displaying the popularity of each XPF in the “Theft with Trespass”
scenario).
227. XPF 4 (“True Remorse, Acknowledgment of Guilt, and Apology Immediately after
Offense”) and XPF 15 (“Has Already Paid Substantial Civil Compensation to the Victim”).
228. XPF 4 in Scenarios B and C. See supra Table 5, Columns B–C (displaying the popularity
of XPF 4 in “Personal Injury” and “Governmental Corruption” scenarios).
229. See id. Column E (reporting that 40.1% of participants supported XPF 4).
230. But notice that this is not necessarily true of XPF magnitude if all zero values are
excluded. Consider the “Column Averages” row in Table 6. If one considers just those who
actually adjusted punishment, the amount of that adjustment is different for different baseline
scenarios but is not directly related to the seriousness of the offense.
231. This is true for XPF 7 (“Victim Wants More Punishment”), XPF 8 (“Public Outrage over
Offense”), and XPF 12 (“Bad Deeds or Character”). See supra Table 5 (illustrating consistent, low
popularity).
232. This occurs with several XPFs: the unpopular XPF 13 (“Special Talents”), the
moderately popular XPF 2 (“Public Acknowledgment of Guilt and Apology without Remorse”),
XPF 4 (“True Remorse, Acknowledgment of Guilt, and Apology Immediately After Offense”), XPF
11 (“Good Deeds After Offense”), XPF 17 (“Hardship for Offender Himself”), and XPF 18 (“Old
Age”). See id. (illustrating the drop-off in popularity).
233. This occurs with two relatively popular XPFs: XPF 15 (“Has Already Paid Civil
Compensation”) and XPF 16 (“Hardship for Offender’s Family or Others”). See id. (illustrating
the drop off in popularity).
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popularity declines as offense seriousness increases suggests that the
interaction between the XPF and the underlying offense is quite
complex and is more than just a reflection of a punishment factor’s
initial popularity.234
In addition to XPF popularity, XPF magnitude is similarly
affected by switching among baseline scenarios. In Table 7 below, we
list XPF magnitude by scenario (taken from the lower half of each cell
in Table 5), but this time we include additional information about
whether the figures in any row are significantly different from one
another—that is, whether the magnitude of an XPF for a given offense
differs significantly from the magnitude of the same XPF for a
different offense.
To test whether the magnitude of each XPF is affected by the
baseline scenario to which it is paired, we conducted an analysis of
variance (ANOVA) for each XPF. The ANOVA examines whether
there are statistically significant differences among a series of
distributions.235 If the analysis yields an F value that is sufficiently
high, we may conclude that the values within the row are significantly
different from one another. The rows have been bolded where this is
the case. A post hoc analysis using the Scheffé method reveals which
figures in the row are statistically different from which other figures.
If two roman numerals in the same row differ, the ESN adjustments
for those scenarios are significantly different from one another.236 For
example, for XPF 4, Scenario A is significantly different from Scenario
D, as indicated by the absence of any roman numeral in common
between them. But for the same XPF, Scenarios A and B are not
significantly different, as indicated by the presence of a roman
numeral in both cells, nor are Scenarios A and C, B and D, and D and
E.

234. Indeed, the finding of this sort of complex interactive effect between XPF and offense is
consistent with previous studies suggesting that lay intuitions regarding proper punishment are
quite nuanced and sophisticated and take account of a wide range of interacting factors. See, e.g.,
ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 210, at 139–47; Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban,
Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1846 (2007) (“The
conclusion suggested by the empirical evidence is that people take account of a wide variety of
factors and often give them quite different effect in different situations. That is, people’s
intuitions of justice are not vague or simplistic, as claimed, but rather sophisticated and
complex.”).
235. See GEOFFREY KEPPEL, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS: A RESEARCHER'S HANDBOOK 45–50, 111–
12 (3d ed. 1991) (describing the F statistic and ANOVA).
236. See id. at 172–73 (describing the Scheffé method).
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TABLE 7. EFFECTS OF BASELINE CRIME SCENARIO ON
XPF MAGNITUDE
Scenarios
A.
Theft with
Trespass

B.
Personal
Injury

C.
Governmental
Corruption

D.
Causing Death by
Risk Taking

E.
Intentional Killing
and Abduction

-0.94 i, ii

-0.66 ii, iii

-1.15 i

-0.51 iii, iv

-0.33 iv

9. Rehabilitated

-0.32

-0.26

-0.29

-0.32

-0.26

15. Has Already Paid Substantial
Civil Compensation to the Victim

-0.88 i

-0.62 i

-0.68 i

-0.24 ii

-0.04 ii

3. Truly Remorseful with Public
Acknowledgment of Guilt and
Apology

-0.42 i

-0.36 i

-0.37 i

-0.21 i, ii

-0.11 ii

16. Hardship for Offender’s Family
or Others

-0.68 i

-0.63 i

-0.77 i

-0.53 i

-0.09 ii

14. Already Suffering from His
Offense

-0.76

-0.37

-0.49

-0.81

-0.36

2. Public Acknowledgment of Guilt
plus Apology

-0.39 i

-0.29 i, ii

-0.24 i, ii, iii

-0.14 ii, iii

-0.04 iii

17. Hardship for Offender Himself

-0.67

-0.48

-0.76

-0.53

-0.37

6. Victim Wants Less or No
Punishment

-0.28

-0.21

-0.20

-0.27

-0.15

1. Public Acknowledgment of Guilt

-0.20

-0.19

-0.20

-0.15

-0.05

XPFs
4. True Remorse, Acknowledgment
of Guilt, and Apology Immediately
After Offense

18. Old Age

-0.33

-0.34

-0.35

-0.40

-0.12

7. Victim Wants More Punishment

+0.09

+0.11

+0.05

+0.07

+0.00

11. Good Deeds After Offense

-0.16

-0.14

-0.12

-0.09

-0.05

5. Forgiveness by Victim

-0.25

-0.29

-0.07

-0.19

-0.10

12. Bad Deeds or Character

+0.04

+0.15

+0.01

+0.04

+0.01

8. Public Outrage over Offense

+0.09

+0.06

+0.00

+0.16

-0.03

10. Good Deeds Before Offense

-0.08

-0.11

-0.18

-0.05

-0.04

13. Special Talents

+0.12

+0.03

-0.02

+0.02

-0.03

Column Averages

-0.33 i

-0.26 ii, iii

-0.32 i, ii

-0.23 iii

-0.12 iv

N.B.: Rows are bolded when the null hypothesis of no difference among scenarios may
be rejected at the p < 0.05 level.

Again, Table 7 shows that there is a complex interactive effect
between a punishment factor and the underlying offense. For example,
the magnitude of XPF 15 (“Has Already Paid Substantial Civil
Compensation to the Victim”) displayed in Scenarios A, B, and C
diminished considerably in Scenarios D and E.237 XPF 9
(“Rehabilitated”) displayed a different tendency: the factor’s

237. See supra Table 7 (detailing effects of baseline crime scenarios on XPF magnitude).
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magnitude remained consistent across all scenarios.238 Interestingly,
XPF magnitude does not always depend on the seriousness of the
underlying offense. For example, XPF 4 (“True Remorse,
Acknowledgment of Guilt, and Apology Immediately After Offense”)
displayed greater magnitude when applied to Scenario C than when
applied to Scenario B,239 even though Scenario C was considered the
more serious offense.240
E. Relative Relation Among XPFs by Popularity
Table 8 below presents in each column the relative popularity
of each XPF. XPFs are ranked according to their popularity, or, in
other words, by the percentage of subjects who indicated that the
factor should affect the baseline punishment assignment. XPFs are
ordered according to their overall support, as provided in Table 5
above.
The relative popularity of an XPF varies depending on the
baseline offense. This is itself no surprise. Subsection C has shown
that there is some interactive effect between XPF popularity and
offense. More surprising is that there is some general consistency in
XPF ranking across the different kinds of offenses. XPFs that have a
low relative rank for one scenario commonly have a similarly low rank
for other scenarios; XPFs that have a high relative rank for one kind
of offense tend to maintain that approximate ranking for other
offenses. Such consistency is found in XPFs at all ranges of popularity.
For example, XPF 13 (“Special Talents”) ranks as the XPF with the
least popularity for all five scenarios.241 Likewise, XPF 2 (“Public
Acknowledgment of Guilt plus Apology”) varies only slightly in rank,
from 6th to 12th among the baseline scenarios.242

238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See supra Table 4 (reporting the average punishment given for each baseline scenario,
without consideration of any XPF).
241. See supra Table 8 (ranking XPF 13 as 18 – 18 – 18 – 18 – 18). Similarly, XPF 10 (“Good
Deeds Before Offense”) ranks fourteenth or fifteenth for the nonhomicide offenses and
seventeenth for the homicide offenses. Id.
242. See id. (ranking XPF 2 as 8 – 6 – 6 – 12 – 8 ).
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TABLE 8. RANK BY POPULARITY OF XPFS FOR EACH SCENARIO
Scenarios
A.

XPFs
4. True Remorse,
Acknowledgment of Guilt and
Apology Immediately After
Offense
9. Rehabilitated
15. Has Already Paid
Substantial Civil Compensation
to the Victim
3. Truly Remorseful with Public
Acknowledgment of Guilt and
Apology

Theft with
Trespass

B.
Personal
Injury

C.
Governmental
Corruption

D.
Causing
Death by
Risk Taking

E.
Intentional
Killing and
Abduction

Row
Averages

1

1

1

1

1

1

(77%)

(66%)

(71%)

(49%)

(40%)

(61%)

3

3

3

2

2

2

(53%)

(51%)

(42%)

(43%)

(31%)

(44%)

2

2

2

6

10

3

(65%)

(53%)

(44%)

(28%)

(14%)

(41%)

4

5

5

5

3

4

(53%)

(48%)

(38%)

(28%)

(21%)

(38%)

16. Hardship for Offender’s
Family or Others

5

4

4

4

16

5

(50%)

(51%)

(41%)

(29%)

(8%)

(36%)

14. Already Suffering from His
Offense

6

7

7

3

9

6

(46%)

(37%)

(28%)

(40%)

(14%)

(33%)

2. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt plus Apology

8

6

6

12

8

7

(45%)

(42%)

(30%)

(20%)

(15%)

(30%)

17. Hardship for Offender
Himself

7

10

8

8

11

8

(45%)

(31%)

(27%)

(24%)

(13%)

(28%)

6. Victim Wants Less or No
Punishment

9

9

14

7

4

9

(40%)

(32%)

(16%)

(25%)

(19%)

(27%)

1. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt

11

8

9

10

5

10

(32%)

(35%)

(26%)

(22%)

(16%)

(26%)

18. Old Age
7. Victim Wants More
Punishment
11. Good Deeds After Offense
5. Forgiveness by Victim
12. Bad Deeds or Character
8. Public Outrage over Offense
10. Good Deeds Before Offense
13. Special Talents

10

12

11

11

14

11

(33%)

(26%)

(22%)

(21%)

(10%)

(22%)

15

16

10

9

6

12

(20%)

(19%)

(25%)

(23%)

(15%)

(20%)

13

11

15

13

15

13

(26%)

(29%)

(16%)

(17%)

(10%)

(20%)

12

13

17

14

13

14

(31%)

(23%)

(13%)

(16%)

(12%)

(19%)

17

14

12

15

7

15

(14%)

(21%)

(20%)

(16%)

(15%)

(17%)

16

17

13

16

12

16

(16%)

(17%)

(17%)

(15%)

(13%)

(16%)

14

15

16

17

17

17

(20%)

(20%)

(15%)

(12%)

(7%)

(15%)

18

18

18

18

18

18

(14%)

(12%)

(11%)

(10%)

(6%)

(11%)

Some XPFs, however, change noticeably in their relative
popularity, especially for the homicide offenses in Scenarios D and E.
The second most popular XPF for theft, personal injury, and
corruption—XPF 15 (“Has Already Paid Substantial Civil
Compensation to the Victim”)—drops to sixth for the reckless-killing
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scenario and to tenth for the murder scenario. In other words, it is not
simply that XPF popularity falls as the seriousness of the offense
increases, but that XPF popularity in relation to other XPFs also falls
as the underlying offense becomes more serious.
For some XPFs, the drop-off in relative popularity occurs just
for the murder case. For example, XPF 16 (“Hardship for Offender’s
Family or Others”) holds steady at either fourth or fifth place for most
offenses but drops dramatically to sixteenth for murder.243 Similarly,
XPF 14 (“Already Suffering from His Offense”) ranks between third
and seventh in Scenarios A through D but drops to ninth place in
Scenario E.244
In contrast, some XPFs become relatively more popular as the
underlying offense becomes more serious. For example, XPF 8 (“Public
Outrage over Offense”) moves from sixteenth in Scenario A to twelfth
in Scenario E. Another aggravator of relatively weak popularity—XPF
12 (“Bad Deeds or Character”)—similarly increases its popularity
relative to other XPFs, at least for the most serious offense, murder.245
This trend raises an interesting interpretive issue. It may be that
XPFs like these two increase in rank not because the logic of the
mitigation is more compelling as applied to serious offenses but rather
because other mitigations are less persuasive and the rankings of
these XPFs increase primarily because they hold their popularity
while others lose theirs.
One final interesting pattern of this sort is found in the pair of
XPFs relating to victim desire for more or for less punishment. The
relative popularity of XPF 6 (“Victim Wants Less or No Punishment”)
increases its rank from mid-range for nonhomicide offenses to fourth
for murder. At the same time, XPF 7 (“Victim Wants More
Punishment”) moves from fifteenth place in Scenario A to sixth place
in Scenario E. Thus, victim views on punishment appear to be taken
more into account as offense seriousness rises.

243. See id. (ranking XPF 16 as 5 – 4 – 4 – 4 – 16).
244. See id. (ranking XPF 14 as 6 – 7 – 7 – 3 – 9). A somewhat less dramatic example is
found for XPF 17 (“Hardship for Offender Himself”). This mitigation ranks between seventh and
tenth place in Scenarios A through D but dropped to eleventh place for murder. Old age as a
mitigation (XPF 18) shows a similar minor drop in relative popularity for murder, ranking tenth
to twelfth in Scenarios A through D, but dropping to fourteenth for murder. See id. (ranking XPF
18 as 10 – 12 – 11 – 11 – 14).
245. See id. (ranking XPF 12 as 17 – 14 – 12 – 15 – 7). XPF 9 (“Rehabilitated”) exhibits a
similar pattern, moving from third in Scenario A to second in Scenario E. So too does XPF 1
(“Public Acknowledgment of Guilt”), which increases from eleventh place in Scenario A to fifth
place in Scenario E. See id. (ranking XPF 1 as 11– 8 – 9 – 10 – 5).
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F. Demographic Differences
In conducting the study, we collected data on respondents’ race,
marital status, gender, income, age, and education level. Race, marital
status, and gender were each coded as categorical variables (i.e.,
variables with two or more categories with no intrinsic ordering to the
categories). Income, age, and education level, on the other hand, were
recorded as continuous variables (i.e., the relative values are ordered
and magnitudes are straightforwardly interpretable). Tables 9
through 12 below explore the ways in which these variables influence
XPF popularity and XPF magnitude.
1. Demographic Differences and Popularity
Table 9 reports differences in XPF popularity by race, marital
status, and gender. The number in each cell corresponds to the
difference in support between demographic groups. Positive values
indicate that white, unmarried, or male subjects changed punishment
more often than did nonwhite, married, or female subjects; negative
values indicate that nonwhite, married, or female subjects changed
punishment more often. For instance, the value -23.6%, as reported for
XPF 15 in Scenario A, indicates that XPF popularity among nonwhite
respondents exceeded XPF popularity among white respondents by
23.6%. Table 9 contains only statistically significant values and
designates those XPFs that were expected to aggravate, rather than
mitigate, punishment.
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TABLE 9. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN XPF
POPULARITY BY RACE, MARITAL STATUS, AND GENDER
Scenarios
A.
Theft with
Trespass

B.
Personal
Injury

C.
Governmental
Corruption

XPFs

D.
Causing
Death by
Risk Taking

E.
Intentional
Killing and
Abduction

Row
Averages

4. True Remorse,
Acknowledgment of Guilt,
and Apology Immediately
After Offense
9. Rehabilitated
15. Has Already Paid
Substantial Civil
Compensation to the
Victim

gen -16.4%

race -23.6%

race 16.1%

3. Truly Remorseful with
Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt and Apology

gen 7.1%

16. Hardship for
Offender’s Family or
Others

race 21.6%

14. Already Suffering from
His Offense

mar 17.0%

2. Public Acknowledgment
of Guilt plus Apology

gen 14.4%

17. Hardship for Offender
Himself

race 16.0%

race 10.0%
gen 16.6%

gen 17.9%

6. Victim Wants Less or
No Punishment
1. Public Acknowledgment
of Guilt

race 13.6%

gen 9.4%
race 14.8%

race 12.2%

race 13.1%

race 9.8%
gen 8.0%

race 13.2%
gen 13.2%

gen 20.2%

18. Old Age
7. Victim Wants More
Punishment

race 10.3%

race 5.7%
gen 9.7%

gen 14.9%

race 13.7%

race 9.1%

mar 11.3%

race 18.4%

race 23.7%

race 15.6%

race 11.9%

11. Good Deeds After
Offense

race 13.8%

race 16.4%

mar 13.8%

race 11.2%
gen -9.3%

race 8.1%
mar 8.3%

5. Forgiveness by Victim

race 15.9%

race 13.3%

race 20.8%

race 13.9%

12. Bad Deeds or
Character

race 15.6%

race 13.3%

race 16.5%

race 12.5%
gen 6.1%

race 12.3%
mar 15.7%

race 15.7%

race 12.2%

race 11.2%
mar 7.3%

– aggravation XPF

mar -16.3%

race 19.5%

– aggravation XPF
8. Public Outrage over
Offense
– aggravation XPF

race 16.7%
gen 13.2

10. Good Deeds Before
Offense

race 5.5%
gen 5.7%

13. Special Talents
Column Averages
gen 5.7%

race 5.5%
mar 5.2%
gen 4.4%

mar -3.7%

race 10.1%

race 14.6%

race 7.1%

race 9.3%
mar 3.6%
gen 5.6%

race 9.4%

race 5.7%
mar 1.7%
gen 3.4%

NB: A positive value indicates that white, unmarried, or male subjects changed
punishment more than nonwhite, married, or female subjects did by that percentage amount.
Only differences significant at the p < 0.05 level are reported.
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Race. Race seems to have the greatest demographic effect on
the popularity of XPFs. In the fifteen mitigation XPFs,246 XPF
popularity among whites was significantly greater than among
nonwhites in seventeen of the seventy-five variations. XPF popularity
was significantly greater among nonwhites in only one variation. But
whites were not generally more sympathetic to all offenders. In the
three aggravation XPFs, XPF popularity among white subjects was
significantly different from XPF popularity among nonwhites in ten of
the fifteen variations, while in none of these variations was XPF
popularity greater among nonwhites. Column averages show that,
generalizing across all XPFs, whites adjusted punishment
significantly more than nonwhites in three scenarios. Row averages
show that, generalizing across all scenarios, they adjusted punishment
significantly more than nonwhites for thirteen of the eighteen XPFs.
The “all cells” figure shows that overall XPF popularity among whites
exceeded XPF popularity among nonwhites by a statistically
significant 5.7%.
Gender. Gender has less of an effect on XPF popularity than
race. XPF popularity among males was often greater than among
females. In the fifteen mitigation XPFs, males adjusted punishment
significantly more often than did females in seven of seventy-five
variations. Females adjusted punishment significantly more than
males in only two variations. In none of the three aggravation XPF
variations did gender produce a statistically significant difference
between genders, though XPF 12 (“Bad Deeds or Character”) did show
an overall significant difference. Column averages show that,
generalizing across all XPFs, males were more likely to make a
punishment adjustment than females in three of the five scenarios.
Row averages show that, generalizing across all scenarios, XPF
popularity among males was significantly greater than among females
for six of the eighteen XPFs. The “all cells” figure shows that overall
XPF popularity among males exceeded XPF popularity among females
by a statistically significant 3.4%.
Marital Status. Marital status seems to have the least effect
of the demographic factors. In the fifteen mitigation XPFs, XPF
popularity among unmarried respondents was significantly greater
than among married respondents in two of the seventy-five variations.
In the three aggravation XPFs, XPF popularity among unmarried
respondents was greater than among married respondents in two of
the fifteen variations; in one instance XPF popularity among married
respondents was greater. Column averages show that, generalizing
246. Three of the XPFs invited aggravations of punishment, as noted in supra Table 11.
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across all XPFs, unmarried subjects adjusted punishment significantly
more often than did married respondents in only two of the five
scenarios. Row averages show that, generalizing across scenarios, XPF
popularity among unmarried respondents was significantly greater
than among married respondents for two of the eighteen XPFs. The
“all cells” figure indicates that overall XPF popularity among
unmarried respondents exceeded XPF popularity among married
respondents by a slight though statistically significant 1.7%.
In overview, according to the “all cells” figure, XPF popularity
among white, male, or unmarried respondents was greater than
among nonwhite, female, or married respondents, though the actual
difference was slight: only 5.7%, 3.4%, and 1.7%, respectively. This
pattern held true in Scenarios B and D, where across all XPFs white,
male, or unmarried subjects tended to record more adjustments than
did their nonwhite, female, or married counterparts, but again with
single-digit differences. For XPFs across scenarios, all but the three
most popular XPFs showed significant differences in XPF popularity
among at least one demographic group, but again the extent of the
differences rarely reached above single digits.
Next, Table 10 reports the effect of age, income, and education
on XPF popularity. The values in each cell represent the correlation
between XPF popularity on the one hand and income, age, or
education on the other. A positive correlation indicates that as income,
age, or education level increases, the likelihood that a respondent
would chose to change punishment increases. A negative correlation
indicates that as income, age, or education level increases, the
likelihood that a respondent would chose to change punishment
decreases. Only statistically significant correlations are reported.
Income. Income seems to have a weak effect on XPF
popularity. Income significantly correlates with XPF popularity in
only two XPF variations: XPF 4 under Scenario D and XPF 11 under
Scenario D. Generalizing across scenarios, income only has a
significant effect on XPF 4, suggesting that at least for XPF 4 (“True
Remorse, Acknowledgment of Guilt, and Apology Immediately After
Offense”), as income increases so too does the XPF’s intuitive appeal.
XPF 4 seems to be an isolated example, however. Generalizing across
XPFs, income has no significant effect on XPF popularity. Similarly,
generally across all responses, there was no significant correlation
between income and XPF popularity.
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TABLE 10. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN XPF
POPULARITY BY INCOME, AGE, AND EDUCATION
Scenarios
A.
Theft with
Trespass

B.
Personal
Injury

C.
Governmental
Corruption

XPFs
4. True Remorse,
Acknowledgment of Guilt, and
Apology Immediately After
Offense
9. Rehabilitated

age -0.18

15. Has Already Paid
Substantial Civil Compensation
to the Victim

edu -0.21
age -0.14

3. Truly Remorseful with Public
Acknowledgment of Guilt and
Apology

D.
Causing
Death by
Risk Taking

E.
Intentional
Killing and
Abduction

inc 0.27
edu 0.17

inc 0.11
age -0.07

edu 0.16
age -0.16

edu 0.10
age -0.11

edu -0.22
age -0.17

edu -0.11
age -0.07

age -0.16

age -0.08

16. Hardship for Offender’s
Family or Others
14. Already Suffering from His
Offense

edu -0.09
edu -0.18

edu -0.15

2. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt plus Apology

edu -0.17

edu -0.12

edu -0.18

edu -0.09
age 0.08

age -0.20

17. Hardship for Offender
Himself
6. Victim Wants Less or No
Punishment

Row
Averages

age -0.20

age -0.23

age 0.16

age -0.11

18. Old Age

edu -0.15

edu -0.17

age -0.15

edu -0.12

7. Victim Wants More
Punishment

age -0.16

1. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt

edu -0.23
age -0.16

– aggravation XPF
age 0.19

11. Good Deeds After Offense
5. Forgiveness by Victim

age -0.17

age -0.10

inc -0.16

age 0.17

edu -0.10

12. Bad Deeds or Character
– aggravation XPF
8. Public Outrage over Offense
– aggravation XPF

age -0.16

age -0.23

edu -0.04

edu -0.05
age -0.06

age -0.19

age -0.13

10. Good Deeds Before Offense
13. Special Talents
Column Averages

age -0.02
edu -0.04

NB: Values are correlations. A positive value means that as age, income, or education
increases, XPF popularity increases, and a negative value means that as age, income, or
education increases, XPF popularity decreases. Only values significant at the p < 0.05 level are
reported.
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Age. In some variations, age seems to play a significant role in
determining whether to apply an XPF. Significance was found in
eighteen of the variations tested, though the size of the correlation
was minimal in all variations. Notably, where the correlation with age
was statistically significant, as age increased, the likelihood that a
respondent would change his punishment decreased. Indeed,
generalizing across scenarios, this sort of relationship was found in
XPFs 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 15, and generally across all responses there was
a slight negative correlation between XPF popularity and age (-0.02).
Education. Education also seemed to play a significant role in
some variations. Significance was found in eleven of the variations
tested. Generalizing across XPFs, there was a slight though
significant correlation found between education and XPF popularity in
responses to Scenarios A (“Theft with Trespass”) and B (“Personal
Injury”). Generalizing across scenarios, seven XPFs showed some
correlation with education, all but one of them negative.247 That
statistical significance was found generally for XPFs 14 through 18,
which constitute Group D (“Suffering Apart from Official
Punishment”). This suggests that as education level increases Group
D’s rationale is less persuasive. Still, the correlation is slight. Across
all responses, a slight negative correlation was found to be statistically
significant.
2. Demographic Differences and Magnitude
In addition, we analyzed the relationship between the
demographic variable and XPF magnitude. Our findings are shown in
Tables 11 and 12 below.
Table 11 reports the relationship between race, marital status,
and gender on the one hand and XPF magnitude on the other. To
calculate the value in each cell, we took the absolute value of the
average response among each demographic group (measured in ESN
values) and subtracted the average among white, married, or male
responses from the average among nonwhite, unmarried, or female
responses. Accordingly, a positive value indicates that the average
ESN value among white, married, or male responses was greater and
a negative value indicates that it was smaller. Usually, the values
here connote a decrease in punishment but, for the XPFs marked as
“aggravation XPF,” the values actually connote an increase in
punishment.
247. XPFs 5, 14, 15 16, 17, and 18 demonstrated a negative correlation with education. XPF
4 demonstrated a positive correlation.
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TABLE 11. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN XPF
MAGNITUDE BY RACE, MARITAL STATUS, AND GENDER
Scenarios
A.

XPFs

Theft with
Trespass

4. True Remorse,
Acknowledgment of Guilt, and
Apology Immediately After
Offense

B.
Personal
Injury

C.
Governmental
Corruption

race 0.332

race 0.484
mar -0.410

D.
Causing
Death by
Risk Taking

E.
Intentional
Killing and
Abduction

Row
Averages

mar 0.105

9. Rehabilitated
15. Has Already Paid
Substantial Civil Compensation
to the Victim
3. Truly Remorseful with Public
Acknowledgment of Guilt and
Apology

race 0.173

race 0.116

race 0.010

gen 0.090

16. Hardship for Offender’s
Family or Others
14. Already Suffering from His
Offense

race 0.280

2. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt plus Apology
17. Hardship for Offender
Himself

race 0.503

6. Victim Wants Less or No
Punishment
1. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt
gen 0.376

18. Old Age
7. Victim Wants More
Punishment

race 0.147

race 0.123

– aggravation XPF
11. Good Deeds After Offense

race 0.230

race 0.260

5. Forgiveness by Victim
12. Bad Deeds or Character

race 0.152

– aggravation XPF
8. Public Outrage over Offense
– aggravation XPF
race 0.235

10. Good Deeds Before Offense
13. Special Talents
Column Averages

race 0.119

race 0.115

race 0.053

NB: Values are absolute differences in average ESNs, including responses of 0 (no
change). A positive value indicates that the average white, married, or male response was
greater than the average nonwhite, unmarried, or female response by that amount. A negative
value indicates that the average nonwhite, unmarried, or female response was greater than the
average white, married, or male response by that amount. Only values significant at the p < 0.05
level are reported.
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Race. Race was a relatively important predictor of XPF
magnitude, though it was only found to be a statistically significant
predictor variable in eleven variations. For eight variations, the
average punishment change among white respondents exceeded that
of nonwhite respondents. For the remaining three, the inverse was
true: the average punishment change among nonwhite respondents
exceeded that of white respondents. Generalizing across XPFs, a
significant relationship was found for only two XPFs: XPF 3 and 7. For
XPF 3 (“Truly Remorseful with Public Acknowledgment of Guilt and
Apology”), the average among white respondents exceeded the average
among nonwhite respondents by an ESN value of 0.116. For XPF 7
(“Victim Wants More Punishment”), which is an aggravation XPF, the
average among nonwhite respondents exceeded the average among
white respondents by an ESN value of 0.123, indicating that nonwhite
respondents gave more punishment than did white respondents when
the victim wanted more punishment. Generalizing across XPFs, a
significant relationship was found in Scenarios B (“Personal Injury”)
and C (“Governmental Corruption”), with the average among whites
exceeding the average among nonwhites in both situations. Across all
responses, white responses exceeded nonwhite responses by an
average ESN value of 0.053.
Gender. The difference between male and female average
responses was statistically significant in only one XPF: XPF 18 (“Old
Age”) in Scenario D (“Causing Death by Risk Taking”). A slight,
though still significant, difference was found across all scenarios in
XPF 1 (“Public Acknowledgment of Guilt”). No other significant
differences were found, suggesting that male and female respondents
did not significantly disagree about much when it came to assigning
punishment in light of one of the punishment factors tested.
Marital Status. Likewise, there was only one statistically
significant difference between married and unmarried responses: XPF
4 (“True Remorse, Acknowledgment of Guilt, and Apology
Immediately After Offense”) in Scenario C (“Governmental
Corruption”). Generalizing across scenarios, a significant difference
was also found for XPF 9 (“Rehabilitated”). For XPF 9, the married
average exceeded the nonmarried average by 0.105, indicating a
greater punishment deduction among married respondents. No other
statistically significant difference was found.
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TABLE 12. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS WITH XPF
MAGNITUDE FOR AGE, INCOME, AND EDUCATION
Scenarios
A.

XPFs

Theft with
Trespass

4. True Remorse,
Acknowledgment of Guilt, and
Apology Immediately After
Offense
9. Rehabilitated

B.
Personal
Injury

inc -0.26

age -0.17

D.
Causing
Death by
Risk Taking

E.
Intentional
Killing and
Abduction

Row
Averages

inc -0.25

edu -0.14
inc -0.24

inc -0.12

edu -0.23

15. Has Already Paid
Substantial Civil Compensation
to the Victim
3. Truly Remorseful with Public
Acknowledgment of Guilt and
Apology

C.
Governmental
Corruption

edu -0.09

age 0.17
edu 0.18

inc -0.15

edu 0.01
inc 0.20

inc 0.16

edu -0.13
inc 0.15

16. Hardship for Offender’s
Family or Others

edu 0.07

14. Already Suffering from His
Offense

inc -0.16

age -0.08
edu -0.14
inc -0.18

2. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt plus Apology
age -0.17
inc -0.18

17. Hardship for Offender
Himself
6. Victim Wants Less or No
Punishment

inc -0.08
age -0.10

age 0.15

1. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt

edu -0.18
inc 0.19

18. Old Age

age -0.22
inc -0.20

age -0.09

7. Victim Wants More
Punishment
– aggravation XPF
11. Good Deeds After Offense

age -0.26

5. Forgiveness by Victim

age -0.18

12. Bad Deeds or Character

age -0.07

inc -0.17

– aggravation XPF
8. Public Outrage over Offense

age -0.17
inc 0.16

– aggravation XPF
10. Good Deeds Before Offense

edu -0.15

age -0.09
edu -0.10

edu -0.15

13. Special Talents
Column Averages

age -0.08

age -0.09
inc -0.04

age -0.06

age -0.06

age -0.06

age- 0.06
inc -0.04

NB: Values are correlations. A positive value means a higher age, education level, or
income level correlates with increasing the sentence imposed, and a negative value means those
variables correlate with lower sentences. Only values significant at the p < 0.05 level are
reported.
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Age. Respondent age seems to have an effect, albeit limited, on
how much respondents adjust punishment. Age significantly
correlated with punishment adjustment in only eight of the ninety
offense-XPF variations. In seven of those instances, higher age
correlated with reducing punishment; in only one did higher age
correlate with increasing punishment. Row averages show that,
generalizing across all scenarios, higher age correlated with reducing
punishment for five of the eighteen XPFs. The column averages all
show that in each scenario as age increased there was a slight, though
statistically significant, tendency for punishment adjustments to be
more lenient, regardless of the XPF in question.248
Income. Respondent income seems to have somewhat less
influence over the extent to which a subject adjusted punishment.
Income significantly correlated with punishment adjustment in only
fourteen of the ninety offense-XPF variations. In nine of those
instances, higher income correlated with mitigating punishment in
light of some XPF; in the other five, higher income correlated with
increasing punishment. Row averages show that higher income
generally correlated with reducing punishment for only two of the
eighteen XPFs.249 Column averages show that when generalizing
across XPFs only in Scenario B (“Personal Injury”) was there a
statistically significant, though slight, tendency for higher wage
earners to be more sympathetic to the offender. The “all cells” figure
suggests that this tendency may also be true across both XPFs and
scenarios generally, though no significant correlation between income
and punishment adjustment was found in Scenarios A, C, D, or E.
Education. Finally, education also has a limited effect on
punishment adjustment. Education significantly correlated with
punishment adjustment in only nine of the ninety offense-XPF
variations. In seven of those instances, higher levels of education
correlated with reducing punishment for the XPF at issue; in the other
two, higher education correlated with increasing punishment. Row
averages show that, generalizing across all scenarios, greater
education levels correlated with punishment reductions in three of the
eighteen XPFs. Column averages show that, generalizing across all
XPFs, greater education was not statistically significant in reducing
punishment.250
248. The “all cells” figure reports the same finding.
249. See supra Table 12 (noting the effect of income on XPF 2 (“Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt plus Apology”) and XPF 4 (“True Remorse, Acknowledgment of Guilt, and Apology
Immediately after Offense”)).
250. Similarly, there was no significant correlation generally across all XPFs and all
scenarios.
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In overview, age, income, or education correlated with
punishment adjustment in only a few specific instances. Age and
income have some statistically significant correlation with the amount
by which respondents adjusted punishment, but the magnitude of the
correlation is only slight.
To summarize, in the vast majority of XPF and base scenario
variations, there are no demographic differences. However, some
variations did show some differences. Being white, male, unmarried,
older, richer, or more educated generally predicted a greater
willingness to give the XPF mitigations tested here, though there are
exceptions. We do not know, on these analyses, if there is an
interactive effect among these demographic variables.
G. Local vs. National Differences
Because we collected data from both a local (Chicago, Illinois)
and national (Mechanical Turk) sample, we are able to see whether, at
least in this instance, the results from a particular local community
vary significantly from those of a national sample. Table 13 reports
the same information as Table 5 but with the local and national
samples segregated, showing XPF popularity on the upper line of each
cell and XPF magnitude on the lower line of each cell. For the sake of
simplicity, values are reported only when the two samples had
responses that were statistically significant (p < 0.05). When there
was significance, we followed up with a regression analysis to
determine whether it remained after controlling for age, income,
education, race, gender, and marital status. Values are italicized if
they remained significant after controlling for these demographic
variables.
Table 13 indicates that there are fewer statistically significant
differences between the two samples than one might expect, and even
where there are statistically significant differences, they are of a small
magnitude. Overall, the local sample was more likely to adjust
punishment than the national sample, but only by 5.6%.251 There was
no statistically significant difference overall in XPF magnitude
between the two groups.

251. See 31.9% to 26.3% in the “all cells” figures at the bottom right of the table.
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TABLE 13. COMPARISON OF LOCAL TO NATIONAL SAMPLE FOR
ADJUSTMENT OF PUNISHMENT (SCENARIOS A THROUGH C)
Scenarios
A.
Theft with Trespass

XPFs

Local

Nat’l

-0.24

-0.051

0.17

0.37

27.1%

9.2%

B.
Personal Injury
Local

Nat’l

C.
Governmental Corruption
Local

Nat’l

-0.08

0.17

-0.28

-0.03

17.7%

28.4%
-0.21

14.5%
0.15
6.4%

1. Public
Acknowledgment of
Guilt
2. Public
Acknowledgment of
Guilt plus Apology
3. Truly Remorseful with
Public Acknowledgment
of Guilt, and Apology
4. True Remorse,
Acknowledgment of
Guilt, and Apology
Immediately After
Offense
5. Forgiveness by Victim
6. Victim Wants Less or
No Punishment
7. Victim Wants More
Punishment
8. Public Outrage over
Offense

29.7%

14.2%

9. Rehabilitated
10. Good Deeds Before
Offense
11. Good Deeds After
Offense
12. Bad Deeds or
Character

32.4%

13. Special Talents

29.7%

7.8%

17.9%

0.19

-0.01

-0.20

0.10

37.7%

23.9%

57.4%
-1.11

32.8%
-0.61

31.0%

17.2%

14. Already Suffering
from His Offense

-0.57

-0.16

15. Has Already Paid
Substantial Civil
Compensation
16. Hardship for
Offender’s Family or
Others
17. Hardship for
Offender Himself
18. Old Age
Column Averages

44.4%
40.6%
-0.29

27.3%
36.8%
-0.37

37.0%
-0.09

33.2%
-0.23

-0.57

-0.24

32.6%
-0.43

25.9%
-0.28
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TABLE 13. COMPARISON OF LOCAL TO NATIONAL SAMPLE FOR
ADJUSTMENT OF PUNISHMENT (SCENARIOS D THROUGH E)
Scenarios
D.
Causing Death by Risk
Taking

XPFs

Local

Nat’l

E.
Intentional Killing and
Abduction
Local

Nat’l

34.4%

28.1%

7. Victim Wants More
Punishment

26.0%

17.5%

8. Public Outrage over
Offense

20.7%

12.9%

11. Good Deeds After Offense

24.3%
-0.18

17.2%
-0.08

12. Bad Deeds or Character

23.9%
-0.01

13.4%
0.09

17.7%

6.9%

39.1%

30.0%

1. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt

Local

Nat’l

0.09

-0.10

Row
Averages

2. Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt plus Apology

3. Truly Remorseful with
Public Acknowledgment of
Guilt, and Apology

0.02

-0.15

-0.20

-0.05

4. True Remorse,
Acknowledgement of Guilt,
and Apology Immediately
After Offense
5. Forgiveness by Victim
6. Victim Wants Less or No
Punishment

9. Rehabilitated
10. Good Deeds Before
Offense

10.8%

13. Special Talents

2.7%

14. Already Suffering from
His Offense
15. Has Already Paid
Substantial Civil
Compensation

26.2%

8.4%

16. Hardship for Offender’s
Family or Others

43.5%
-0.87

22.2%
-0.38

19.7%

3.1%

46.1%
-0.69

30.4%
-0.46

17. Hardship for Offender
Himself

33.9%

19.3%

21.3%

9.2%

33.5%

25.0%

18. Old Age

32.3%

15.6%

16.4%

6.9%

29.7%
-0.40

18.2%
-0.26

Column Averages

29.3%

22.1%

19.4%

13.5%

31.9%

26.3%

NB: Reported differences are significant at the p < 0.05 level. Those values that are
significant at the p < 0.05 level after controlling for age, income, education, race, gender, and
marital status are italicized.

2b. Robinson_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

804

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

4/27/2012 1:59 PM

[Vol. 65:3:737

Row averages confirm this general tendency. Looking generally
across scenarios, for seven XPFs there were significant differences in
XPF popularity not attributable to demographic differences; for only
two XPFs was there a significant difference in XPF magnitude not
attributable to demographic differences. In contrast, column averages
show that, generally across XPFs, there were no unexplainable
differences between samples.
On the other hand, Table 13 also makes clear that there were
some real differences in the responses of the two samples. There were
eight variations that display significant differences in XPF popularity
between the samples and six variations that display significant
differences in XPF magnitude. Thus, the Table suggests that in some
cases there may be real disagreements about whether certain XPFs
merit any punishment reduction at all and if so how much. While
some of these differences may be attributable to differences in testing
conditions, they may also be the result of differences between the local
and national community. The Chicago native might have different
views than a demographically similar person who lives elsewhere.
For example, there were unexplainable differences in XPF
popularity for three XPFs under Scenario C (“Governmental
Corruption”): XPF 13 (“Special Talents”), XPF 16 (“Hardship for
Offender’s Family or Others”), and XPF 18 (“Old Age”). No other
scenario had as many unexplainable significant differences in XPF
popularity. The differences were quite large as well: while only 6.4% of
the national respondents believed that “special talents” affected their
punishment assignment for a corrupt government official, 17.9% of the
Chicago respondents thought that it did. Similarly, while family
hardship influenced only 32.8% of the national respondents, it
influenced a majority (57.4%) of the Chicago respondents. Given
Chicago’s famed experienced with public corruption,252 this difference
may be the result of a unique local political culture.
H. Summary of Study Conclusions
There is support among lay people for punishment factors that
have traditionally been excluded from the criminal law’s liability and
punishment rules. Every XPF tested had some support, even in
relation to Scenario E (“Intentional Killing and Abduction”), the most
serious offense. A number of XPFs enjoyed the support of a majority of
study participants, with support reaching as high as 77% for the most
252. See generally JAMES L. MERRINER, GRAFTERS AND GOO GOOS: CORRUPTION AND REFORM
(2008).

IN CHICAGO
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popular XPF.253 On the other hand, most XPFs did not gain the
support of a majority of study participants. Even for a relatively minor
offense like that in Scenario A (“Theft with Trespass”), factors that are
quite common in practice, and that policymakers, lawyers, and
scholars have advocated for, failed to persuade many study
participants.
Nevertheless, lay intuitions about XPFs are actually quite
nuanced and sophisticated. The seriousness of the underlying offense
almost always influenced decisions about whether, in light of some
punishment factor, to grant a punishment reduction. The seriousness
of the offense also affected decisions about the size of the change in
punishment, if any change was made. Moreover, some punishment
factors seem better suited for certain types of crimes than others. Few
punishment factors have appeal no matter what the underlying
offense. For example, while XPFs like paying substantial civil
compensation were popular mitigating factors when the underlying
offense was not serious, once a human death was involved, XPFs like
victim forgiveness overtook them in popularity.
For the most part, lay judgments across demographics proved
remarkably consistent. Differences attributable to age, income, or
education level were few and slight. Likewise, while there were
differences between whites and nonwhites, males and females, and
married and unmarried respondents, neither XPF popularity nor XPF
magnitude tended to differ in most cases among these demographic
groups. Of the demographic variables tested, race seemed to have the
biggest effect: whites were more likely to adjust punishment in
response to XPFs than nonwhites, especially in response to mitigation
XPFs, although whites were not more sympathetic to offenders
overall, and the overall effect of race was relatively small.
There were slight differences between the two sample sets
employed. Most of these differences were attributable to demographic
differences between the samples. Those differences that could not be
explained by demographic factors may have reflected either
differences in testing conditions or, possibly, unquantifiable variables
unique to the local Chicago sample.

253. XPF 4 (“True Remorse, Public Acknowledgment of Guilt, and Apology Immediately
After Offense”) turned out to be the most intuitively popular XPF, followed by XPF 9
(“Rehabilitated”) and XPF 15 (“Has Already Paid Substantial Civil Compensation to the Victim”).
XPF 4 in fact achieved majority support in three scenarios: Scenario A (“Theft with Trespass”),
Scenario B (“Personal Injury”), and Scenario C (“Governmental Corruption”).
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE RULES AND PRACTICES
For many, if not most, of the XPFs noted in Part I there are
ongoing discussions about the propriety of their use in assessing
punishment. Many are part of larger debates, such as those regarding
plea bargaining, restorative justice, the role of public outrage in
sentencing, and the victims’ rights debate on victim participation in
sentencing. These discussions commonly focus on a variety of
utilitarian and desert concerns,254 but all of them, we argue, are
touched by the findings reported in Part II.
Two findings of Part II have particularly broad implications for
criminal justice reform, taken up in Sections A and B below. First, the
high level of disagreement regarding some XPFs highlights the
problem of disparity in application. Second, the high level of
agreement in supporting the use of some XPFs and in rejecting the
use of others suggests that adjudication practices that conflict with
these views are likely to undercut the system’s moral credibility with
the community it governs and thereby its ability to harness the
powerful forces of normative and social influence. Finally, Section C
compares the support for, or opposition to, each XPF reported in Part
II, with the current practice in the use of that XPF as described in
Part I.

254. There have been substantial debates on the utilitarian merits of particular XPFs. For
instance, theorists have sparred over whether the practice of plea bargaining—an instance
where an offender acknowledges his guilt—is warranted. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The
Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 671 (1981) (“Even to contemplate an
exchange of human liberty for a purely economic benefit . . . may offend us and may seem
inconsistent with a central value that society should strive to preserve.”); Scott W. Howe, The
Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 599, 604–05 (2005) (“Prosecutors and judges willingly
trade some deserved punishment in individual cases to maximize the punishments they can
secure. They must make this trade-off because they have limited resources.”). Similar debates
have focused on the merits of taking apology into account. See, e.g., Berry, supra note 98, at 884
(“As the genuineness of post offense conduct can easily be questioned, the benefit to the state of
mitigating a sentence based on post offense conduct by the offender toward the victim will often
not be apparent . . . .”); Bibas, supra note 38, at 339 (“While one cannot be certain, it is at least
possible that apologetic, forgiven offenders are more likely to take their lessons to heart and less
likely to recidivate.”). Advancing utilitarian arguments, some scholars have advocated for a more
prominent role of victims in sentencing. See, e.g., Erin Ann O’Hara & Maria Mayo Robbins,
Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both Victim and Social Needs, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
199, 201 (2009) (proposing that “victims should have control over a portion of the offender’s
criminal sentence”). Good deeds and rehabilitation as grounds for mitigation have been argued
for on the grounds that such allowances at sentencing would incentivize such conduct. See, e.g.,
Hessick, supra note 66, at 1149 (“Just as the government may encourage guilty pleas and
cooperation with law enforcement through sentence mitigation, so too could military service and
charitable works be encouraged through mitigating sentences based on prior good acts.”).
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A. Disagreements About XPFs and the Problem of Disparity in
Application
As Part I notes, there exist a myriad of points in the criminal
justice process at which a decisionmaker may choose to take account
of, or to ignore, the existence of an XPF. A prosecutor may consider
XPFs when deciding to prosecute an offender or when negotiating a
plea bargain. A judge may consider an XPF at sentencing, occasionally
upon legal authority, but more typically in the exercise of his
sentencing discretion. In some trials, XPFs may come out during trial
testimony and may be taken into account by jurors in determining a
trial verdict. And in some sentencing regimes,255 juries also participate
in the sentencing process and may consider an XPF in that context.
Finally, parole boards and corrections officials may consider XPFs in
deciding when to release an offender.
There seems to be general agreement that a central feature of
fairness and justice is consistency in the application of punishment.
Similar offenders committing similar offenses ought to receive similar
punishment. One’s punishment ought to depend upon one’s offense,
culpability, and capacities, not upon which decisionmaker one
happens to draw. As the Senate Report to the Federal Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 put it:
Sentencing disparities that are not justified by differences among offenses or offenders
are unfair both to offenders and to the public. A sentence that is unjustifiably high
compared to sentences for similarly situated offenders is clearly unfair to the offender; a
sentence that is unjustifiably low is just as plainly unfair to the public. Such sentences
are unfair in more subtle ways as well. Sentences that are disproportionate to the
seriousness of the offense create a disrespect for the law. Sentences that are too severe
create unnecessary tensions among inmates and add to disciplinary problems in
prisons.256

Yet, as Part II makes clear, there is enormous disagreement as
to the propriety of the application of many XPFs, even when people
are considering the exact same XPF for the exact same offense and
255. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1510
(2001) (noting that by the mid-twentieth century, thirteen states continued to allow sentencing
by juries).
256. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 34 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3228–29; see
Michael M. O’Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures
to Reduce Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721, 729 (2002) (quoting S. REP.
NO. 98-225, at 34). In United States v. Booker, Justice Breyer explained that Congress’s basic
goal in passing the Sentencing Act was increased uniformity in punishment. 543 U.S. 220, 253
(2005). The concept of uniformity can be described simply as encapsulating the “twin goals of (i)
similar treatment of similarly situated offenders and (2) different treatment of differently
situated offenders.” Michael M. O’Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 249, 249
(2005).
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offender, as occurs in the study. In more than 20% of the cells in Table
5 (nineteen of ninety), the subjects were almost evenly split, 40% to
60% or closer. In more than a quarter of the cells (twenty-five of
ninety), there is a dissent of more than a third of the subjects. In
almost half of the cells (forty-three of ninety), a quarter or more of the
subjects are dissenting. There is little reason to think that these high
levels of disagreement on some applications of some XPFs disappear
among the police, prosecutors, judges, jurors, parole boards, and other
criminal justice system decisionmakers.257 Yet, clearly it would be
unacceptable if the chances that one’s punishment depended on the
luck of the draw of a decisionmaker were as random.
Indeed, even more egregious are situations where an offender
faces a decisionmaker holding an idiosyncratic view. Imagine an
offender being judged by a decisionmaker who falls into a small group
of dissenters. More than half of the cells (forty-eight of ninety) in
Table 5 show a minority view of 25% of less. Some of the XPFs had a
dissenting group as small as 6%. A lack of guidance in the application
of XPFs invites the problem explicitly noted by the Senate: offenders
receiving “more favorable or less favorable treatment because [they]
happen[] to be sentenced by a particular judge.”258
Several examples illustrate the disparity problem. Consider the
case of Frank Serafini, who was a popular Pennsylvanian state
senator.259 Serafini was called to testify before a grand jury against a
relative who was allegedly involved in an illegal scheme to funnel
money through intermediaries to the Dole presidential campaign.
Serafini denied knowledge, but when Serafini’s aide was caught
covering for the Senator, prosecutors charged Serafini with perjury
and succeeded in convicting him at trial. The federal judge sentencing
Serafini gave him a relatively light sentence, granting a three-level
downward departure from the guideline sentencing range260 based on
letters “contain[ing] substantive descriptions of Serafini’s generosity
with his time as well as his money. Several constituents and friends
described situations in which Serafini extended himself to them in
257. As a general matter, there is disagreement between the population at large and
sentencing officials on how strict the criminal justice system should be. See Stephanos Bibas,
Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 928 (2006)
(reviewing studies). As to what factors to take into account at sentencing, there is good reason to
think that the judgment of criminal justice officials will often depart from that of nonspecialists.
See Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 37,
43–45 (2005) (detailing the ways in which different people view the purposes of sentencing).
258. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 79.
259. United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 758 (3d Cir. 2000).
260. Id. at 778. Serafini was required to serve five months in prison and five months under
house arrest.
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unique and meaningful ways during times of serious need.”261 The
letters convinced the sentencing judge that Serafini’s prior good deeds
“weren’t acts of just giving money, they were acts of giving time, of
giving one’s self.”262 The Third Circuit upheld the departure.
Serafini’s case closely approximates XPF 10 (“Good Deeds
Before the Offense”) in Scenario C (“Governmental Corruption”). Yet,
only 15% of respondents found that the XPF should alter the
offender’s punishment. The court’s decision to grant a downward
departure for prior good deeds would seem to be at odds with the
strong majority view of our lay participants.
The case of Edward Warfield provides another example.263
Warfield was a security guard at a white supremacist compound in
Idaho. When a car stopped near the compound and backfired, Warfield
mistook the sound as a gunshot. He and his confederates gave chase
and shot at the car, which crashed in a ditch. Warfield then attacked
the driver, who was white and whom he called a “white bitch.”264
Warfield was arrested and pled guilty to aggravated assault. Though
couching the denial in terms of incapacitation, the judge clearly had
Warfield’s racism in mind when imposing the sentence, stating that
“the Court is not persuaded that defendant has abandoned his
interracial philosophy.”265 The judge denied Warfield’s motion for a
reduced sentence.
Although Warfield’s racism would doubtlessly win him few
supporters, likewise, our results suggest that few people would be
willing to aggravate his punishment because of it. His case seems
closest to XPF 12 (“Bad Deeds or Character”) in Scenario B (“Personal
Injury”), but only 20% of respondents thought that an aggravation of
punishment was appropriate in that scenario. The sentencing judge in
this case presumably is from that minority.266
Other cases are emblematic of the failure of decisionmakers to
take into account XPFs that enjoy considerable public support. Donald
Pennington, for instance, received a forty-eight-month sentence for
261. Id. at 773.
262. Id. at 775.
263. State v. Warfield, 34 P.3d 37, 37 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001).
264. Id. at 38.
265. Id.
266. The case of Patrick Lett is similarly illustrative. Lett was a military veteran with an
outstanding service record but fell into drug dealing. United States v. Lett, 483 F.3d 782, 782–87
(2007). The court, looking favorably upon his service as well as his decision to reenlist, gave Lett
a substantial downward departure after a post-trial motion and sentenced him to time served—a
mere 11 days. Id. Although the Eleventh Circuit overturned the sentence on appeal, Lett’s case
demonstrates the influence that even unpopular XPFs like prior good deeds may have on
sentencing authorities. Id.
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abusing his position as president of a grocery chain by receiving secret
payments and kickbacks.267 By the time of his sentencing, Pennington
had been found liable to the grocery store company for $6 million. The
judge, however, refused to give Pennington any credit for this
substantial civil fine, “conclud[ing] that an adverse judgment in a
prior civil case involving the same fraudulent conduct is not a
permissible basis to reduce the sentence for the criminal fraud.” The
Eighth Circuit agreed. But, if Pennington’s case is an example of XPF
15, then there may well be substantial lay support for such mitigation
of punishment. If the underlying offense is seen as similar to the theftand-trespass scenario, then it has 65% support; or, as seems more
likely, if the underlying offense is more akin to the governmentalcorruption scenario, then it has 44% support. In other words, many
respondents would have disagreed with the judge and would have
granted Pennington some leniency in light of the hefty civil judgment.
Consider too the case of Tracy Westmoreland, who was
convicted of criminally deviant conduct for inducing an underage
partner to perform oral sex on him.268 Although Westmoreland was a
minor at the time of the offense, by the time of sentencing he had
started a family and showed how a prison sentence would be unduly
hard on his family. The judge refused to grant any adjustment on
family hardship grounds.269 If analogized to XPF 16 (“Hardship on
Family”) in Scenario B (“Personal Injury”), the judge’s sentence may
be in tension with the views of a majority of the respondents in that
case.
The potential for disparity in application is exacerbated by the
demographic differences in assessing XPFs reflected in Tables 9 and
10. While there is much agreement across demographics, there also is
some disagreement. An offender’s punishment ought not depend upon
the particular demographic characteristics of the decisionmaker, be it
a sentencing judge, a sentencing jury, or a prosecuting attorney
exercising discretion in striking a plea and sentence agreement.
Thus, if XPFs are to be relied upon in assessing punishment,
there are good reasons to articulate rules governing their use, or at
least some informal guidance, both to better avoid abuse and to
improve the uniformity in XPFs’ application among different
decisionmakers. For all offenders, punishment ought to depend upon

267. United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060, 1060 (8th Cir. 1999).
268. Westmoreland v. State, 787 N.E.2d 1005, 1005 (Ind. App. 2003).
269. On appeal, the appellate court reversed. Id.
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the same set of factors relevant to the case, not upon the personal
preferences and idiosyncrasies of the individual decisionmaker.270
The strong trend in American criminal justice is to attempt to
guide the exercise of discretion as much as possible, in large part out
of a commitment to equality of treatment among similarly situated
offenders. Toward that end, some parts of the system have
experimented with using guidelines—some American jurisdictions
have developed sentencing guidelines, parole release guidelines, or
charging guidelines. As we better understand the affect that people
give to XPFs, we will be better able to construct guidelines that
articulate principles to guide reliance upon XPFs, wherever they may
be used.
B. Strong Support for, or Opposition to, an XPF and the Problem of
Undermining the Law’s Moral Credibility
As one of us has argued elsewhere, there is reason to believe
that there is good utility in a criminal justice system that distributes
liability and punishment in concordance with the citizens’ shared
intuitions of justice.271 First, some of the system’s power to control
conduct derives from its potential to stigmatize violators—with some
potential offenders this is a more powerful, yet an essentially cost-free,
control mechanism when compared to imprisonment. Yet the system’s
ability to stigmatize depends upon it having moral credibility with the
community. That is, for a conviction to trigger community
stigmatization, the law must have earned a reputation for following
the community’s view on what does and does not deserve moral
condemnation. Liability and punishment rules that deviate from a
community’s shared intuitions of justice undermine this reputation.272
Second, the effective operation of the criminal justice system
depends upon the cooperation, or at least the acquiescence, of those
involved in it—offenders, judges, jurors, witnesses, prosecutors, police,
and others. To the extent that people see the system as unjust—as in
conflict with their intuitions about justice—that acquiescence and
cooperation is likely to fade and to be replaced with subversion and

270. This lack of uniformity may be impossible to adequately remedy at some stages of the
criminal process, such as in prosecutorial charging decisions or in the decisions of law
enforcement officers to pursue or abandon an investigation. Because these decisions are
nonreviewable and not generally subject to public scrutiny, they may be difficult to address on a
large scale.
271. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 175–213; Robinson & Darley, Intuitions, supra note 3;
Robinson & Darley, Utility, supra note 3; Robinson, Goodwin & Reisig, supra note 3.
272. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 176–78.
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resistance. Vigilantism may be the most dramatic reaction to a
perceived failure of justice, but a host of other less dramatic (and more
common) forms of resistance and subversion have appeared. Jurors
may disregard their jury instructions. Police officers, prosecutors, and
judges may make up their own rules. Witnesses may not offer their
information or testimony. And offenders may be less likely to
acquiesce to adjudication and correctional processes.273
The criminal law may gain compliance through another
mechanism: if it earns a reputation as a reliable statement of what the
community perceives as condemnable, people are more likely to defer
to its commands as morally authoritative, especially in those
borderline cases in which the community is uncertain as to the
propriety of certain conduct. The importance of this role should not be
underestimated. Since our society is complex and interdependent, a
characteristically “victimless crime” may be anything but victimless.
When a legal system criminalizes some action, an actor ought to
respect the law regardless of whether he intuits the system’s
rationale. The widespread belief that the law is an accurate guide to
prudential and moral behavior facilities such deference.274
Perhaps the greatest utility of empirical desert comes through
a subtler, but potentially more influential, mechanism. The real power
to gain compliance with society’s rules of prescribed conduct lies not in
the threat of official criminal sanction, but in the influence of the
intertwined forces of social and individual moral control. The
networks of interpersonal relationships in which people find
themselves, the social norms and prohibitions shared among those
relationships and transmitted through those social networks, and the
internalized representations of those norms and moral precepts
control people’s conduct. The law is not irrelevant to these social and
personal forces. Criminal law, in particular, plays a central role in
creating and maintaining the social consensus necessary for
sustaining moral norms. In fact, in a society as diverse as ours, the
criminal law may be the only society-wide mechanism that transcends
cultural and ethnic differences. Thus, the criminal law’s most
important real-world effect may be its ability to assist in building,
shaping, and maintaining these norms and moral principles. It can
contribute to and harness the compliance-producing power of
interpersonal relationships and personal morality, but it will only be
effective in doing so if it has sufficient credibility.275
273. Id. at 178–84.
274. Id. at 187–89.
275. Id. at 186–87.
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The extent of the criminal law’s effectiveness in all these
respects—in bringing the power of stigmatization to bear; in avoiding
resistance and subversion to a system perceived as unjust; in gaining
compliance in borderline cases through deference to its moral
authority; and in facilitating, communicating, and maintaining
societal consensus on what is and is not condemnable—is to a great
extent dependent on the degree to which the criminal law has gained
moral credibility in the minds of its citizens. Thus, the criminal law’s
moral credibility is essential to effective crime control and is enhanced
if the distribution of criminal liability is perceived as “doing justice”—
that is, if it assigns liability and punishment in ways that the
community perceives as consistent with its shared intuitions of justice.
Conversely, the system’s moral credibility, and therefore its crimecontrol effectiveness, is undermined by a distribution of liability that
conflicts with community perceptions of just desert.276
A recent empirical study confirms that distributing
punishment in ways that conflict with people’s judgments about
justice does undermine the system’s moral credibility with them,277
and, further, that such undermining does indeed have the negative
practical effects suggested above.278 The study tested lay subjects’
relative judgments of blameworthiness in cases involving the most
popular modern crime-control doctrines: three strikes and other
habitual offender statutes, high drug-offense penalties, adult
prosecution of juveniles, abolition or narrowing of the insanity
defense, strict liability, felony murder, and the criminalization of
regulatory violations. It found that current law seriously conflicts with
people’s intuitions of justice by exaggerating the punishment
deserved.279 It also found that these conflicts did indeed undermine
the criminal justice system’s reputation with people. More
importantly, the study showed that that disillusionment translated
into specific negative effects likely to hurt the law’s crime-control
effectiveness: it undermines people’s willingness to comply with the
law’s prohibitions in cases where the reason for them is not clear to
them as well as their willingness to assist authorities in enforcement
efforts, participate themselves when needed, stigmatize conduct that
the law punishes, and internalize the norms against conduct that the
law condemns.280

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Robinson, Goodwin & Reisig, supra note 3, at 1995–2025.
Id. at 2001–08.
Id. at 2001–08, 2016–25.
Id. at 1961–79.
Id. at 1995–2025.
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If the objective of criminal law is to build moral credibility with
the community it governs, it should regularly take account of XPFs
that have strong support in that community, which is not now done in
any consistent fashion. For example, true remorse demonstrated by
acknowledgment of guilt and apology before being a suspect (XPF 4)
has strong support among laypersons in the study and dramatically
reduces punishment. Indeed, it has support from a majority of
participants for all offense scenarios except for the two homicide cases.
A criminal justice system that ignores such an XPF risks being seen
as deaf to the community’s views of proper punishment.
At the same time, maintaining the criminal law’s moral
credibility with the community also means avoiding reliance upon
XPFs that the community rejects as irrelevant to punishment. Seven
of the XPFs had average support across all scenarios of 20% or less
(XPFs 7, 11, 5, 12, 8, 10, and 13, in decreasing order of support). 281
Allowing decisionmakers to rely upon these XPFs risks undermining
the criminal law’s moral credibility, thereby undermining its ability to
harness the powerful forces of normative and social influence.
Of course, these conclusions are not without caveats. While the
improper consideration (or lack thereof) of an XPF might have
detrimental effects on the law’s moral credibility, this can only occur if
the treatment of the XPF is publicized.282 This detrimental effect is
heavily dependent on accurate, detailed reporting by the media. If, for
example, a court ignores an XPF in sentencing a defendant despite
that factor’s importance to the public, the law’s moral credibility may
only be harmed if the public learns that the XPF was ignored.283
Conversely, a court applying XPFs in accordance with the public’s
wishes might nonetheless be seen as unjust where the media fails to
provide details of sentencing decisions.284 When a sentence is reported
in isolation, which is the traditional news-coverage approach, it may
seem inappropriate, yet an examination of a fuller collection of cases
may suggest that it is indeed just the sentence this offender deserves,
given his relative blameworthiness.
The demographic results reflected in Tables 9 and 10 and the
local-national differences reflected in Table 13 also have implications
for maximizing the system’s moral credibility with the community it
governs. To the extent that different communities hold somewhat
different views about the propriety of one or another XPF, there might
281.
282.
283.
284.

See supra Table 5.
See Robinson & Darley, Intuitions, supra note 3 (explaining these detrimental effects).
Id.
Id.
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be value in having the system reflect those differences. And to the
extent that different demographics of different areas predict different
views on XPFs, then again differences in treatment of XPFs might be
appropriate. Sometimes such regional differences might be feasible,
such as in setting the policy for a city’s sentencing courts. At other
times, taking account of such differences will not be feasible, as in
drafting state-wide or country-wide sentencing guidelines, although
such guidelines might allow deviations where such regional
differences are shown. On the other hand, the differences between
regions and among different demographic groups tend to be
sufficiently small that the failure to heed them might well have a
minimal effect.
C. Empirical Support vs. Current Use of XPFs
The study reported in Part II reveals that lay intuitions about
XPFs can be quite nuanced. For example, according to lay intuitions,
an offender’s reaction to his own offense is an important consideration
at sentencing, but his character or past actions are less significant.
Remorse, regret, and apology seem to mitigate punishment in people’s
judgments, but character on its own does not appear to be a powerful
factor. For another example, the extent of an offender’s suffering is an
important consideration, and there seems to be substantial, consistent
support for the idea that punishment ought to be tailored, if possible,
to a defendant’s unique circumstances, especially when he or those
close to him may doubly suffer because of an official sanction. Still
further, whether and to what extent a punishment factor should affect
punishment often depends on the nature of the underlying offense.
Judges, parole boards, or other sentencing officials who hope to track
lay intuitions should think not only about the punishment factor
presented to them but the nature of the underlying offense. In a
number of situations, the underlying offense appears to alter the logic
of mitigation or aggravation. Finally, lay intuitions seem to hold that
punishment should more readily take mitigating XPFs into account
when the underlying offense is not a serious one. The reverse, though,
may not be true: lay intuitions do not increase the effect of
aggravating XPFs when the underlying offense is more serious.
The implications for each XPF are discussed below.
1. Offender Reaction to the Offense
The first four XPFs vary in the degree of remorse expressed. In
XPF 1, the offender offers a bare acknowledgment of guilt; in XPF 2,
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he adds an apology; in XPF 3, he convinces the sentencing authority of
his remorse; and in XPF 4, he turns himself in. Unsurprisingly, XPF 4
enjoyed more support than XPF 3, which in turn enjoyed more support
than XPF 2, and so forth. Notably, this group of offenses appeared to
be the most intuitively powerful, suggesting that a punishment regime
that takes into account an offender’s remorse likely tracks lay
intuitions, though the way in which it does so is important.
XPF 4 (“True Remorse, Public Acknowledgment of Guilt,
and Apology Immediately After Offense”). XPF 4 offers the most
extensive offender reaction of the XPFs in this group—the offender felt
sincerely remorseful and turned himself in even though he had no
reason to fear being caught. More people decided to mitigate the
punishment for the offender who turned himself in than for any other
offender in the study. Support ranged from 77% of respondents in the
theft scenario to 40% of respondents in the murder scenario.
Still, there were some surprising details about XPF 4. First,
while support for XPF 4 was substantial when the defendant
committed theft or assault, when the defendant committed homicide
most respondents did not believe any mitigation was warranted.
Second, among those who believed mitigation was warranted, the
average mitigation was somewhat muted, at least in comparison to
other XPFs. It ranged from 44% for the murder offense to 68% for
corruption. While those numbers are substantial, other XPFs—
namely, XPFs relating to offender hardship—tended to receive larger
mitigations.285 Third, even though corruption was considered a more
serious offense than assault, more people believed that XPF 4 made a
difference in the corruption case than in the assault case, and the
corruption defendant received the largest mitigation (68%) of any
defendant among those subjects willing to mitigate on the basis of
XPF 4.
Those jurisdictions that take sincere remorse into account are
largely consistent with lay intuitions. But such jurisdictions often
leave the decision of whether to take remorse into account wholly to
the discretion of the sentencing judge. Moreover, no jurisdiction seems
to take the sophisticated approach to remorse that lay intuitions
suggest.286 To many respondents, mitigation seems to be more
warranted in a corruption case—perhaps because a public servant
who acknowledges guilt voluntarily gives up all that he illicitly
gained. Offenders who committed serious crimes like reckless
285. See supra Table 6.
286. See supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text (noting that “True Remorse” is often
treated as a discretionary factor at sentencing).
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homicide and murder seem to be considered less deserving of any
mitigation. It also seems that, standing alone, respondents consider
sincere remorse to be less deserving of a large mitigation as are other
punishment factors.
XPF 3 (“Truly Remorseful with Public Acknowledgment
of Guilt and Apology”). Learning about an offender’s true remorse
at sentencing caused respondents to mitigate punishment 38% of the
time—much lower than XPF 4’s 61%. Moreover, among those
respondents who decided to mitigate, the average reduction was 41%,
less than XPF 4’s 55% average. Thus, jurisdictions that hope to track
lay sentiment are right to credit true remorse at sentencing, but only
those that distinguish between remorse at sentencing and remorse
immediately after the offense truly track popular intuitions.
XPF 2 (“Public Acknowledgment of Guilt plus Apology”).
A bare apology appealed to a substantial minority of people. On
average, respondents changed their punishment 30% of the time they
encountered an apology without anything more. Those who did so gave
an average reduction in punishment of 37%. Again, jurisdictions
aiming to approximate popular intuitions should thus distinguish
between true remorse and a bare apology.
XPF 1 (“Public Acknowledgment of Guilt”). XPF 1 was
unsurprisingly the least popular of the XPFs in this group. Across all
defendants, respondents mitigated only 26% of the time, and when
they did so they gave an average reduction of 34%. Thus, a number of
people may favor a reduction in light of a mere public
acknowledgment of guilt, but not as many as would favor an
acknowledgment of guilt with something more. Many jurisdictions
require a showing that defendant who pleads guilty comply with police
investigations, make efforts at victim restitution, or otherwise
manifest more than a mere guilty plea. In light of these findings, those
jurisdictions seem to better track lay sentiment.
2. Victim or Public Reaction to the Offense
XPFs in this category were generally among those with the
least amount of support. Still, they enjoyed sizeable support when the
severity of the underlying offense was minimal, perhaps reflecting the
judgment that victims should have a say in punishment when the
resulting harm was slight.
XPF 5 (“Forgiveness by Victim”). Victim forgiveness was
consistently among the lowest-ranked XPFs, with the XPF influencing
punishment decisions only 19% of the time. Support for mitigation in
light of victim forgiveness also depended on the seriousness of the
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underlying offense: for the relatively minor crimes of theft and
assault, for instance, victim forgiveness resulted in a change in
punishment by 31% and 23% of respondents, but for reckless homicide
and murder, only 16% and 12% of respondents supported mitigation.
Moreover, offense seriousness had a significant effect on the
magnitude of any mitigation: of those who decided to change
punishment, the punishment reduction ranged from 18% for the
assault to 7% for the murder.287 Thus, to the extent that current
practice does not provide for victim forgiveness to be taken into
account, it tracks majority sentiment among lay people, though some
appear to disagree and believe that victim forgiveness makes a
difference.
XPF 6 (“Victim Wants Less or No Punishment”). The
desire by the victim for less punishment appears to be a more
compelling reason for mitigation than is mere forgiveness by the
victim. Even so, across all responses victim desire for less punishment
made a difference only 27% of the time, and it enjoyed less support
among respondents as offense seriousness increased, though it was
among the more widely supported XPFs for the murder offense. But
while XPF 6 never approached majority support, those who believed it
made a difference sometimes gave substantial reductions: the theft
defendant received an average reduction of 69% and the corruption
defendant received an average reduction 58%. The personal injury and
murder defendants received a reduction of only 36% and 41%,
suggesting that perhaps the logic behind XPF 6 holds for property
crimes but might not for crimes against the person. Any such nuance
is lacking from current practice, especially since the desire by a victim
for less punishment seems to come into play only when
decisionmakers exercise their discretion.
XPF 7 (“Victim Wants More Punishment”). Across all
scenarios, fewer people changed their punishment assignment because
of a victim’s desire for more punishment (27%) than did people
because of a victim’s desire for less punishment (20%). But, unlike
XPF 6, support for XPF 7 did not seem to reflect the severity of the
underlying offense: support ranged between 19% and 25%. Moreover,
when respondents decided that a change was warranted, the
aggravation was substantial only in the case of the theft and assault
defendants, who saw a 36% and 47% increase in sentence length,
respectively. For the corruption, reckless homicide, and murder
287. Interestingly, those who mitigated punishment for the corruption offense only did so by
an average of 5%. This may reflect the understanding that corruption—in effect a breach of the
public’s trust—may be the type of crime for which victim forgiveness does not mean much.
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defendants, the increase ranged from negligible to 13%. Thus, the
apparent consensus in current practice against taking into account a
victim’s desire for more punishment seems consistent with lay
intuitions. Even though a sizeable proportion did favor aggravation,
the increase that they on average favored was noteworthy only for the
theft and assault offenses.
XPF 8 (“Public Outrage over Offense”). In XPF 8, subjects
were told about considerable public outcry surrounding the offender’s
conduct. While this was an artificial way to gauge subjects’ reaction to
public outrage—being told about a public reaction is different than
experiencing it—few people actually felt compelled to change their
punishment assignment. On average, respondents elected to change
punishment assignments only 16% of the time after being informed
about public outrage. When they did so, the increase was low: of those
who changed, the increase was an average of 24%. It may be fair to
say then that the reluctance of courts to heed public calls for harsher
punishment may after all be in accordance with lay understandings of
the proper insulation of the individual punishment decision from
public opinion.
3. Offender Status or Characteristics Unrelated to Commission of the
Offense
Decisionmakers often look to an offender’s character, prior
record, efforts at rehabilitation, or rehabilitative potential. Somewhat
surprisingly, few XPFs relating to offender status elicited strong
reactions from the study sample. The strongest XPF in this group—
postconviction rehabilitation—is the outlier, perhaps because a sincere
effort at rehabilitation might be taken as a sign of remorse.
XPF 9 (“Rehabilitated”). XPF 9 focused on postoffense,
presentencing rehabilitation, which the Supreme Court recently
endorsed.288 The study’s findings suggest that the Court’s ruling in
Pepper enjoys widespread intuitive support. For the minor theft and
assault scenarios, a majority of study respondents changed their
sentence when postoffense rehabilitation was at play, and a
substantial minority of respondents did so in the more serious
scenarios. Moreover, the magnitude of punishment adjustment held
steady at between -0.32 for the theft-with-trespass scenario and -0.26
for the intentional-killing-and-abduction scenario, which in percentage
terms corresponds to a decrease in sentence mitigation from 20% to
288. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1229 (2011); see also supra notes 91–94 and
accompanying text (discussing this case).
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16%. Among those who actually chose to change punishment, the
mitigation increased from a low of 29% in the personal-injury scenario
to a high of -0.83 (or 44%) in the intentional-killing-and-abduction
scenario.289 By way of contrast, the district court in Pepper awarded
the defendant, who pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute five hundred
grams or more of methamphetamine, a 59% reduction for his
postoffense rehabilitation.290
Thus, rehabilitation is not only an XPF with significant
support, but it is also one that can carry with it a substantial
reduction in punishment. Moreover, rehabilitation’s intuitive appeal
to those who give it deference becomes more attractive, not less, as
offense seriousness increases. No jurisdiction seems to endorse the
view that one who commits a serious offense is entitled to a greater
mitigation for postoffense rehabilitation than one who commits a less
serious offense.291
There may be some ambiguity in the results as to how
respondents interpreted XPF 9. Respondents who mitigated in light of
XPF 9 may have been struck not by the fact that the rehabilitation
was successful, but that it exhibited the offender’s remorse. If so, the
results may lend additional support to the strong intuitive appeal of
that XPF.
XPF 10 (“Good Deeds Before Offense”). While many have
argued that an offender’s good deeds or character should be taken into
account and several jurisdictions in fact instruct or allow judges to do
so at sentencing,292 the study here revealed that such considerations
failed to substantially influence lay intuitions about deserved
punishment. Only 15% of respondents found any departure warranted
when XPF 10 was at issue, and, of those who did mitigate, the
reduction ranged between 24% and 30%.293 Thus, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, which says that “[m]ilitary . . . [,] civic, charitable, or
public service; employment related contributions; and similar prior
good works are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
departure is warranted,” seems to track lay sentiment.294

289. ESN values of -0.50 and -0.83, respectively.
290. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1236–37. The District Court also cited Pepper’s “lack of a violent
history and, to a lesser extent, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity with Pepper’s
co-conspirators.” Id. at 1237 n.3.
291. Indeed, the Sentencing Reform Act may be read to take the opposite view. It instructs
judges to take into account inter alia the “seriousness of the offense,” but is silent regarding
postconviction rehabilitation. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006).
292. See supra Part I.C.1.
293. In ESN values, -0.39 and -0.52 respectively. See supra Table 6.
294. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (2004).
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XPF 11 (“Good Deeds After Offense”). XPF 11 enjoyed only
slightly more support than XPF 10. Across all scenarios, only 19.6% of
the time did respondents feel that XPF 11 warranted a departure, and
many fewer thought so in the murder scenarios than in the theft or
assault scenarios (10%, 26%, and 29%, respectively). The magnitude of
the departure among those who felt it was warranted was
unsurprisingly larger than for XPF 10, but not by much: the reduction
ranged from 28% to 48% of the original sentence.295
XPF 12 (“Bad Deeds or Character”). Prior criminal record
is, of course, an almost universal aggravation in current sentencing
practice.296 Prior criminal record is not an XPF, but rather formally
part of the legal sentencing rules. But because XPF 12 presented
something analogous to a criminal record—bad character expressed in
a manner unconnected to the nature of the crime—one might expect
that it too would have broad appeal. In fact, XPF 12 was among the
least popular of the XPFs tested. Across all scenarios, only 17%
thought that the offender’s racism warranted a sentencing
enhancement. Moreover, the enhancement differed widely in size. For
instance, of those who thought that XPF 12 made a difference in the
personal-injury scenario, the average enhancement was 64%; of those
who thought the same in the governmental-corruption scenario, the
average enhancement was only 4%. Hence, an offender’s unsavory
character does not appear to substantially influence lay judgment
about proper punishment. Moreover, the magnitude of any
enhancement seems highly contingent on the underlying offense in
ways that are not clear from the data here.
XPF 13 (“Special Talents”). Here, XPF 13 tested the notion
of “Special Talents” by informing subjects that the offender was a
world-class actor. That fact seemed to persuade relatively few
respondents—between 6% and 14%, depending on the underlying
offense. More surprising was the fact that many seemed to consider
XPF 13 to be an aggravating factor, even though the consensus among
sentencing authorities is that talent, if a factor at all, is a mitigating
one. In the minor-theft scenario, for instance, respondents who
changed punishment in light of XPF 13 on average increased
punishment by 83%.297 But in the murder scenario, respondents who

295. In ESN values, -0.48 and -0.74, respectively.
296. E.g., Berman, supra note 64 (“[E]very sentencing system (guideline or otherwise)
provides for sentence enhancements (often huge enhancements) based on . . . a record of prior
bad deeds.”).
297. In ESN value, +0.87.
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changed punishment on average decreased punishment by 34%.298
Hence, special talent, as a punishment factor, also seems to be highly
contingent on the underlying offense.
4. Suffering Apart from Official Punishment
Factors relating to an offender or third party’s suffering exhibit
significant levels of support, but that support seems to rely heavily on
the underlying offense. Indeed, for each of the XPFs below, the
scenario in which the XPF was tested had a significant impact on both
XPF popularity and magnitude.299 But while it seems clear that the
popularity of these XPFs declines as offense seriousness increases,
XPF magnitude and offense seriousness seem to interact in nuanced,
nonobvious ways.
XPF 14 (“Already Suffering as a Result of the Offense”).
XPF 14 presented respondents with the additional fact that the
offender slipped and fell during his escape, breaking his neck and
paralyzing himself. This fact convinced subjects to mitigate
punishment 33% of the time. While 46% of respondents decided to
mitigate punishment when XPF 14 was at play in theft-offense
scenario, only 14% did so in murder scenario. This drop-off in support
likely reflects the intuitive judgment that as the seriousness of the
crime increases, the tendency for the offender’s injury to offset any
punishment decreases. Thus, courts seem to be acting in accordance
with lay judgment when they find in only exceptional cases that
“further legal penalties would be dwarfed by the suffering . . . already
endured.”300 In fact, there seems to be some support for providing
mitigation for minor offenses, like theft with trespass.
Nevertheless, those who found XPF 14 persuasive typically
awarded the offender large discounts, and those discounts increased
as offense seriousness increased.301 Subjects who mitigated
punishment for XPF 14 decreased punishment on average 68%, 49%,
70%, 76%, and 83% for Scenarios A through E, respectively. This
decrease may be due to the fact that subjects were unwilling to deduct
too much time from the comparatively short sentences at stake in
Scenarios A and B, that subjects thought that the offender’s paralysis
rendered him incapacitated and no longer a threat to society, or that
subjects felt that the logic of XPF 14 became more compelling as
298.
299.
300.
301.
Table 7.

In ESN value, -0.59.
See supra Tables 7 & 8.
City of Auburn v. Hedlund, 201 P.3d 315, 319 (Wash. 2009).
Indeed, our analysis found significant differences among mean responses. See supra
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offense seriousness increased. In any case, no sentencing regime
seems to consider suffering as a result of the offense in the same
nuanced way that subjects did here.
XPF 15 (“Has Already Paid Substantial Civil
Compensation to the Victim”). XPF 15 told subjects that the
offender was judged liable in a civil proceeding and was required to
pay substantial compensation. This factor was a relatively popular
one, altering punishment judgments 41% of the time. The popularity
of XPF 15, however, seemed to depend heavily on the underlying
offense. While a clear majority of respondents (65%) thought XPF 15
should mitigate punishment when the offender committed theft with
trespass, only 14% thought so when he committed an intentional
killing. This finding may reflect the understanding that a monetary
“fine” may be enough of a punishment for theft, but for more serious
offenses a fine is not enough to even mitigate prison time. Indeed,
while XPF 15 was the second-most popular XPF in Scenarios A
through C, in Scenario E it fell to tenth. Moreover, even those
respondents who decided to mitigate punishment felt that less
mitigation was deserved as offense seriousness increased. In the theft
scenario, the average mitigation among those who decided to mitigate
was 67%, but in the murder scenario that figure was 19%.
Courts seem to worry about taking account of civil
compensation because they do not want to create economic disparities
among sentences. Our findings, however, suggest that courts
concerned about lay intuitions should be less worried, especially when
relatively minor offenses are at issue. On the other hand, the findings
also may suggest that under current practice people seem to equate
civil and penal sanctions. If we are tracking lay intuitions to maximize
the moral credibility of criminal law and thus gain the benefits
discussed in Part III.B immediately above, one might want to work
hard to distinguish criminal and civil sanctions in people’s minds.302 If
that were one’s goal, then taking account of civil sanctions in
assessing criminal punishment would only undermine the effort to
distinguish the two.
XPF 16 (“Hardship for Offender’s Family or Others”).
XPF 16 confronted respondents with the fact that punishment would
result in depriving the offender’s child of his or her sole caregiver. For
the less serious offenses of theft and assault, a significant minority of
respondents thought that punishment should be mitigated,
presumably to ease the burden on the offender’s child. Like other
302. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL M. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE 218–29
(2006) (discussing these benefits and distinguishing between types of sanctions).
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XPFs in this group, hardship for the offender’s family convinced fewer
subjects as the seriousness of the offense increased. Indeed, while 45%
of respondents would have supported a reduction for the theft
defendant, only 15% would have supported that result for the murder
defendant. Likewise, the magnitude of any reduction depended on the
seriousness of the underlying offense.303
Current practice, which sometimes allows for mitigations in
circumstances like this one, may indeed approximate lay judgment
regarding hardship for others. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, for
example, state that the court should consider “the seriousness of the
offense” in deciding on any departure.304
XPF 17 (“Hardship for Offender Himself”). As opposed to
XPF 16, the claim here is that the punishment imposed may have a
special hardship for the offender, in a way analogous to the operation
of XPF 16, where the punishment presents a special hardship for the
offender’s family. Subjects were told that the offender was recently in
a car accident, from which he is paralyzed. They responded less
favorably than they did to XPF 16: on average, only 28.0% of
respondents thought that mitigation was justified under XPF 17,
compared to 35.9% under XPF 16.
Interestingly, those who thought that the defendant here
deserved mitigation tended to give a fairly large one: on average, the
magnitude of the recorded change was 78%, which was the largest
average mitigation among any of the XPFs tested. Moreover, this
sizeable mitigation by respondents was recorded across all offenses.
Thus, while few thought that mitigation was justified, those who did
were willing to grant substantial reductions to the offender at issue.
XPF 18 (“Old Age”). XPF 18, though dealing only with the
offender’s old age, exhibited many of the same characteristics as did
other XPFs relating to offender suffering. As with XPFs 14 through
17, more respondents elected to mitigate in light of XPF 18 when the
offense was less serious. (XPF popularity ranged from 33% for theft to
10% for murder.) Unlike XPFs 14 through 17, however, the effect of
the underlying offense seemed less pronounced, ranging only between
a low of a 51% reduction for the theft offense and a high of a 75%
reduction for the reckless homicide offense. Thus, while XPF

303. For Scenarios A through E, the magnitude of the reduction among subjects who chose to
mitigate was 61%, 57%, 73%, 72%, and 51%, respectively. The unusual uptake in magnitude for
Scenarios C and D may reflect considerations about letting the offender out in time to actually
provide care for the child.
304. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5H1.6 cmt. note 1(a)(i) (2010).
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magnitude varied in significant ways among offenses, it did so in ways
that are not clear from this analysis.
Still, the number of people who find old age persuasive as a
reason for mitigating punishment clearly declined as offense
seriousness increased. In this regard, lay intuitions seem similar to
settled practice, which grant the mitigation in only exceptional
circumstances. But current practice may depart from lay intuitions
when it does not allow leniency in less serious offenses. Those
jurisdictions that take old age into account do not seem to consider
offense seriousness when doing so.305
CONCLUSION
Part I documents a wide variety of factors that can influence
punishment in current practice but that are generally not recognized
by existing criminal law. These “extralegal punishment factors” can
influence the judgment of decisionmakers throughout the criminal
justice process, such as when prosecutors decide what charge to press,
when judges decide which sentence to impose, when parole boards
decide when to release a prisoner, and when executive officials decide
whether to grant clemency, as well as in less-visible exercises of
discretion, such as in decisions by police officers and trial jurors.
As the empirical findings reported in Part II make clear, there
is broad support for the use of some XPFs in determining punishment
(and all XPFs had some support). On the other hand, most XPFs have
only minority support: half had the support of less than a third of the
study participants. The extent of an XPF’s support, and the extent of
the effect it had in adjusting punishment, commonly depended upon
the nature of the underlying offense. Interestingly, the relative
popularity among the XPFs also was dependent upon the nature of the
underlying offense. Some XPFs were popular or unpopular
throughout, but the popularity of others changed, as with XPFs that
lost relative popularity as the offense became more serious. Both the
level of support and the effect of some XPFs depended upon the
demographic characteristics of a subject. For example, being white,
male, unmarried, older, richer, or more educated commonly predicted
a greater willingness to give the XPF mitigations tested here, though
305. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5H1.1 (“Age may be a reason to depart
downward in a case in which the defendant is elderly and infirm and where a form of
punishment such as home confinement might be equally efficient as and less costly than
incarceration.”); see also State v. de la Garza, 675 P.2d 295, 296 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (“[E]xtreme
youth or old age only becomes a mitigating factor when, because of immaturity or senility, the
defendant lacks substantial judgment in committing the crime.”).
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there are exceptions. Finally, we found differences in the treatment of
some XPFs, for some kinds of offenses, between our local and our
national sample.
The study’s findings suggest a variety of implications for
criminal law and justice policy and practice. In addition to a host of
specific critiques of current practice for each of the XPFs, Part III
notes two broad implications. First, the high level of disagreement
regarding some XPFs suggests that guidance is needed in what is
currently an entirely discretionary application. An offender’s
punishment ought not depend upon the luck of the draw of
decisionmaker. Second, our documentation that current practice can
commonly conflict with shared community views on XPFs also
suggests that some guidance, no matter how informal, may be useful.
If the criminal justice system is to maintain its moral credibility with
the community it governs, and thereby harness the powerful forces of
social and normative influence, it cannot be seen as giving deference
to an XPF that the community rejects nor as ignoring an XPF that the
community broadly supports, yet we show that this does indeed
happen in current practice.

